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ABSTRACT 
 
THE IMPACTS OF TURKEY’S RESPONSE TO PROLIFERATION THREATS IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST ON ITS INTEGRATION WITH EUROPE 
Udum, Şebnem 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
September 2003 
 
 
After the declaration of its candidacy in 1999, Turkey’s relations with the 
European Union (EU) assumed a new course, which requires undertaking certain reforms 
to fulfill the EU accession criteria in order to start accession talks. Now that Turkey’s 
primary task is meeting these criteria, there is a high expectation that Turkey should do 
its best to start these talks as early as possible. However, the issues that started to occupy 
Turkey’s external security agenda in the post-Cold War period are likely to constitute 
important stumbling blocks in Turkey’s integration with the EU. Turkey is under a real 
threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems 
from its neighbors in the Middle East. Turkey’s initial response to the proliferation was to 
consider involvement in missile defense systems, and to produce its own capability that 
addressed the threat directly. Experts foresee that these two processes pull Turkish 
policymaking in different directions and result in a paradox. This thesis is an attempt to 
find a way to get out of this paradox by addressing needs and interests and to lead Turkey 
to converge towards satisfying the EU while at the same time upholding its own security 
interests. To that end, the thesis basically proposes a national nonproliferation strategy 
that involves all the interested actors of Turkish security and foreign policy making and 
relevant institutions. It argues that viable strategic political decisions can be a way out of 
the paradox between Turkey’s security policy and its relations with Europe.  
Keywords: Weapons of mass destruction, Turkey, European Union, Middle East. 
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRKİYE’NİN ORTADOĞU’DAKİ KİTLE İMHA SİLAHLARI  TEHDİTİNE 
VERDİĞİ KARŞILIĞIN AVRUPA İLE ENTEGRASYONUNA ETKİLERİ 
Udum, Şebnem 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Mustafa Kibaroğlu 
 
1999 Helsinki Zirvesi’yle Avrupa Birliği’ne (AB) aday gösterildikten sonra Türkiye’nin 
AB ile ilişkileri yeni bir boyut kazanmıştır. Katılım müzakerelerine bir an önce başlamak 
isteyen Türkiye, AB’ye üyelik kriterlerini yerine getirmelidir; ancak Soğuk Savaş sonrası 
yeni ortaya çıkan güvenlik tehditleri bu süreçte önemli engeller oluşturacak gibi 
görünmektedir. Türkiye Orta Doğu’dan kaynaklanan kitle imha silahlarının ve bunların 
fırlatma vasıtalarının yayılması tehditiyle karşı karşıyadır. Bu tehdite direk karşılık olarak 
Türkiye ilk etapta füze savunma sistemleri içine dahil olmayı düşünmüş ve kendi 
yeteneklerini gelişmiştir. Uzmanlar bu iki sürecin birbirine ters yönde ilerleyeceğini ve 
bir ikilem yaratacağını öngörmektedirler. Bu tez bu ikilemden bir çıkış yolu bulmayı 
amaçlamaktadır. Böylece Türkiye AB’ye entegrasyonu gerçekleştirirken aynı zamanda 
kendi güvenlik çıkarlarını da göz önünde bulundurmuş olacaktır. Bu amaca hizmet etmek 
için, bu tez, Türkiye’nin tüm dış ve güvenlik politikasını belirleyen kurumlarını ve ilgili 
birimlerini kapsayan milli bir kitle imha silahlarının yayılmasının önlenmesi stratejisi 
önermektedir. Temel argüman, yerinde stratejik politik kararların Türkiye’nin güvenlik 
politikası ve AB ile ilişkilerinde yaşayabileceği ikilemden çıkmasını sağlayacak bir yol 
olacağıdır. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Kitle imha silahları, Türkiye, Avrupa Birliği, Orta Doğu. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Integration with Europe has been an important goal of all Turkish governments as 
an inertial extension of the Turkish quest to be part of Europe dating back to the 19th 
century.1 After 1923, M.K. Atatürk set the goal for Turkey as “reaching the level of 
contemporary civilizations” by which he meant the modern world that lied in the West, 
that is, Europe. Consequently, all the Turkish governments paid due respect to this idea, 
and eventually it became a state goal of Turkey.  
Turkey realized this goal to a certain extent by its membership to international 
organizations as well as those pertaining to Europe, inter alia, the League of Nations 
superceded by the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the 
Conference/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE). For 
                                                 
1 In 1839, Ottoman State issued the Gulhane Hatt-i Humayun (Tanzimat Fermani) which acknowledged 
minority rights under the Ottoman state in order to gain the approval of western states to a certain extent-, 
and the Reform Decree (Islahat Fermani) in 1856- which was declared at the Paris Peace Conference of the 
same year, where the Ottoman state was declared as part of the European state system in return for its 
akcnowledgement of minority rights. 
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Turkey, being “European” not only refers to working together with the Europeans in the 
political, economic and security domain, but also it is a matter of identity that will be 
certified by membership in the “Club of Europeans”. That is why, Turkey applied for 
membership to the European Communities soon after their establishment in 1957 with the 
Rome Treaties. Until 1999, Turkey’s applications did not result in a firm commitment for 
full membership2 for a variety of reasons by the European Community (EC)/European 
Union (EU). These reasons were mainly political, economic and cultural, and were 
related less to security concerns.  
Turkey’s relations with the EU assumed a new course after it was declared 
candidate for EU membership at the Helsinki European Council of December 1999. The 
EU now expects Turkey to fulfill the accession criteria in order to begin the negotiations 
for eventual membership. These criteria include, among others, short and medium term 
political and economic criteria, for which Turkey should go through a number of reforms. 
Now that Turkey’s primary task is meeting these criteria, there is a high expectation that 
Turkey should do its best to start the accession talks as early as possible. The DSP (The 
Democratic Left Party)-ANAP (The Motherland Party)-MHP (The Nationalist Action 
Party) coalition government (1999-2002) and the following AKP (Justice and 
Development Party) administration have worked sincerely hard to that end. However, a 
smooth ride to the final destination seems unlikely due to the issues that started to occupy 
                                                 
2 Instead, the EEC and Turkey signed the Ankara Agreement in 1963, which established a customs union 
between Turkey and the EEC to bring Turkey closer to eventual membership. Also, the EC partially 
considered Turkey’s application in 1987, but the Commission declined in 1989. In 1997, the Commission 
acknowledged Turkey’s eligibility for membership, but it was not declared a candidate in the Luxembourg 
European Council in 1997. 
 3 
 
Turkey’s external security agenda in the post-Cold War era and especially in post-
September 113 period.  
The new security challenges include regional instabilities caused by intra-
state/ethnic conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their 
delivery systems, international terrorism, arms and drug smuggling which fuel such 
proliferation, as well as other political and economic uncertainties, and religious 
fundamentalism which serves as the ideological base of many terrorist organizations.  
Turkey is situated in the middle of these new threats that emanate from the 
Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East. More specifically, the Middle East is the very 
region where all of these issues are intermingled. During the Cold War, due to its military 
deterrent and defense capabilities both in the context of its NATO collective security 
assurance, and its military power, Turkey’s threat perception from the Middle East was 
relatively lower, hence it enjoyed staying out of the issues related to the Middle East; 
though it had not only physical but also historical and economic ties with its Middle 
Eastern neighbors, namely, Iran, Iraq and Syria.  
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Turkey has perceived an increasing threat from 
the Middle East, primarily regarding terrorism, proliferation of WMD and their delivery 
systems, ethnic conflicts, and religious fundamentalism. With the Gulf War of 1991, 
Turkey had to give up its non-involvement policy, and to take sides with the US-led 
coalition in a Middle Eastern conflict, against an overt act of aggression by Iraq. The 
changing balances after the War had an impact on Turkey’s perceptions from the region. 
The Middle East started to occupy an important place in Turkey’s foreign and security 
policy agenda in this new era, and the formation of the new policy is still in progress. 
                                                 
3 The terrorist attacks on the US soil on September 11, 2001 will be referred to as 9/11 henceforth. 
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However, the bottomline of this policy is clear: In the face of the WMD capabilities and 
the issue areas between Turkey and these states that can cause tension or conflict and 
trigger intent to employ these weapons, Turkey needs to be able to frame and adopt its 
security policies independently, modernize its military arsenal, bolster its capabilities to 
be able to respond to the new threats, and establish strategic relations with certain 
countries to that end, although these moves may not be welcome by the Europeans. 
This study underlines that Turkey’s responses to threats from the Middle East will 
constitute an important area of tension in Turkish-EU relations, and the most significant 
of these security issues will be the proliferation of WMD, especially after 9/11 and in the 
context of Turkish-US strategic relationship. 
Turkey is faced with a real and increasing threat of WMD and missile 
proliferation from the Middle East. Iran and Syria have WMD and their delivery 
capabilities that can hit targets in Turkey. Iraq was one of the main concerns to the 
international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts before the US-led campaign for a 
regime change in Iraq. Throughout the War, Turkey incurred the real threat of Iraqi 
retaliatory attacks with ballistic missiles tipped with WMD warheads. Turkey lacks the 
adequate systems to defend against them. So far, it has been considering involvement in 
the US “Missile Shield” project, working with Israel on ways to procure state-of-the-art 
missile defense technologies, and to a lesser extent developing its own missiles. Dr. 
Mustafa Kibaroğlu has found out that Turkey’s responses to the proliferation threat at the 
national level are likely to unfavorably impact its relations with Europe in security 
matters, and impair the fulfillment of some of the accession criteria. The two dynamics 
pull Turkey towards opposite ends and result in a paradox. 
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Argument: 
The thesis takes Dr. Kibaroglu’s findings one step further by adding the phrase 
“unless effectively dealt with…” Thus, the argument of the paper is that viable strategic 
political decisions can be a way out of the paradox between Turkey’s security policy and 
its relations with Europe. These policies can be derived by addressing the needs and 
interests4 of Turkey and the EU within this paradox. The thesis basically proposes a 
national nonproliferation strategy based on the findings after the operationalization of 
needs and interests. 
 
Organization: 
The thesis seeks to reconcile the incompatibilities between Turkey’s security 
policy and its decades-long aspiration for integration with Europe with a focus on the 
threat of WMD and missile proliferation emanating from the Middle East.  
The first chapter is an analysis of threat. It looks at Turkey’s security and defense 
policy in general and towards the Middle East in particular. Then, it focuses on the 
proliferation trends and issues in the Middle East, and provides information regarding the 
WMD capabilities of Iran, pre-war Iraq and Syria. For an accurate threat assessment, 
there should be motivations to trigger the use of these capabilities, so, it devotes 
particular attention to regional issues and dynamics. 
The second chapter is about response. The thesis determines that Turkey’s 
deterrent has diminished in the aftermath of the Cold War due to the emerging 
                                                 
4 The thesis borrows this method from the principles of conflict resolution theory, that is win-win solutions 
can be attained when parties to a conflict bargain in terms of their needs and interests instead of positions. 
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asymmetric threats, and it has deficiencies in its defense capabilities to address the 
proliferation threat effectively and sustainably. Thus, it uses policy analysis methodology 
to determine the course of action as the practical policy. The findings demonstrate that 
Turkey has already adopted the option that is the most viable though it needs to be 
complemented with other measures. However, even in its current stage, Turkey’s security 
policy introduces challenges to one of its ultimate goals in Turkish foreign policy, that is 
being a member of the European Union. 
To understand the underlying reasons for the challenge, the third chapter 
scrutinizes the impacts of Turkey’s response on its integration with Europe. After the 
study of the background of relations and what Turkey’s priorities are, the thesis borrows 
Dr. Kibaroglu’s findings to demonstrate the issue areas. 
In the final chapter, the thesis will try to find a way out of the apparent paradox by 
addressing the problem areas on the basis of needs and interests, thereby to move from 
the status quo to the desired outcome, where Turkey is converging towards satisfying the 
EU while at the same upholding its own security interests. The findings will form the 
backbone of recommendations for policymaking, that is, strategic political decisions, 
which the thesis foresees to incorporate in a national nonproliferation strategy that it 
proposes for Turkish foreign and security policymakers.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
TURKEY’S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY AND 
PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
 
2.1. OVERVIEW OF TURKISH SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY 
 
Turkey’s foreign and security policy has been shaped by its geographical status 
and has developed in a historical and cultural context. Turkey has historically exercised 
realpolitik, which has evolved to become defensive in the Republican era.5 More 
specifically, Turkish security policy aimed at maintaining the country’s borders and the 
strategic balance in its immediate region. During the interwar period, Turkey became part 
of security alliances or agreements with the European states, such as Russia and various 
states in the Balkans, and with other states in its region, such as Iraq, Iran and 
Afghanistan. Turkey preferred not to take part in World War II despite the pressures 
coming from some parties to the war. However, Turkey’s geography did not let itself to 
preserve its neutrality after the end of the war. As a result of the Soviet expansionist 
threat, the United States extended Marshall aid to Greece and Turkey. Turkey’s becoming 
                                                 
5 Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, “The Evolution of the National Security Culture and the Military in Turkey,” 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54 No. 1, Fall 2000, p.200. 
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a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1952 made it part of the western camp. During 
the Cold War, Turkey continued leaning towards the West, and established relations with 
the European Economic Community. It pursued a non-involvement policy towards the 
Middle East.6 Its membership to NATO and its military power constituted Turkey’s 
deterrent against threats from the Middle East.  
The end of the Cold War changed the picture dramatically: The demise of the 
Soviet empire eradicated the concrete threat, and introduced new security risks and 
threats. As a result of the change in the nature of threats in the post-Cold War period, 
Turkey has identified the following as new threats and risks: 
• Regional and ethnic conflicts, 
• Political and economic instabilities and uncertainties, 
• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles in its 
neighborhood, 
• Religious fundamentalism, 
• Arms and drug smuggling, and  
• International terrorism.7 
Turkey is situated at the center of these new threats and risks, which emanate from the 
Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, defined by the ‘Bermuda Triangle’8 discourse, 
which identifies the security risks that Turkey incurs.9  
                                                 
6 Between the two world wars, Turkey’s international orientation was non-alignment, exemplified by the 
Sadabad Pact, signed with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, which was basically about non-interference in each 
other’s affairs. It froze relations with the Middle Eastern states during World War I. After Turkey became a 
member to NATO, it perceived the Middle East as a region “out of area.” Also, it feared from being 
dragged into a conflict that included states in the Middle East, especially, the Arab-Israeli conflict. So, it 
avoided taking sides with any of the parties, and chose non-involvement. See Nur Bilge Criss and Pinar 
Bilgin, “Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East,” MERIA, Vol. 1, No. 1, January 1997. <http:// 
meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jv1n1a3.html> (September 1, 2003) 
7 “Turkey’s Defense Policy and Military Strategy-Turkey’s National Defense Policy,” White Paper, Part 
IV, Section I, Turkish Ministry of Defense, 2000. 
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Consequently, Turkey is in a geography where the interests of the global actors 
intersect. Thus, Turkey determined its defense policy in a way that it would contribute to 
and would extend peace and security and formulate strategies that would have 
repercussions on the strategic assessments in the region and beyond. Moreover, Turkey 
prioritizes taking measures to prevent crises and conflicts by participating actively in 
collective defense systems. Turkey’s military strategy complements the aims of its 
defense policy by upholding deterrence, military contribution to crisis management and 
intervention in crises, forward defense, and collective security. In conjunction with the 
needs of this strategy, the Turkish Armed Forces work towards having a deterrent 
military force along with C4ISR (Command, control, communications, computer, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems, superior operational capability 
and fire power, advanced technology weapons and systems, and air/missile defense and 
nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection capability against weapons of mass 
destruction.10  
Because of its geopolitical status, Turkey, since the Republican times, sought 
security through alliances and pursued a circumspect foreign policy.11 In terms of 
security policy, Turkey defined the concepts of strategic partnership and strategic 
cooperation, which would affect its new geopolitical axis in the post-Cold War. These 
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Speech by former Minister of Defense, Hikmet Sami Türk to the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, 3 March 1999. 
9 Due to their geographic location, Europeans incurred these new threats in terms of instability in the 
periphery. Their main task has become to integrate Central and Eastern European countries, which used to 
be on the other side of the “Iron Curtain,” politically, economically and security-wise into a European 
framework in order to address the instabilities. They pondered over defining the Transatlantic link with the 
United States, transformed the EC from a solely economic institution to a political union and worked on 
adding a security and defense pillar to the European Union. The United States, on the other hand, defined a 
global policy, and upheld multilateral institutionalism to address the new threats.  
10 ibid, Part III, Section 2. 
11 A.L. Karaosmanoğlu, 2000, op.cit., p.199.  
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concepts cover joint action and cooperation in regional problems and incidents that occur 
in different areas of the world, military partnership agreements, and formation of 
permanent commissions in economic, military, political and social fields and as a result 
of agreements between mutually favored states.12 In that context, a strategic relationship 
developed between Turkey and the United States in the 1990s, and between Turkey and 
Israel after the 1996 Turkish-Israeli military cooperation agreement. These relations have 
formed the new Turkish alignment strategies in the post-bipolar security framework, by 
redefining the concept of “West”, now replaced by the United States and the EU as two 
different units.13   
The threat from the “East”, on the other hand, is no longer coming from Soviet 
expansionism, but from the Middle East, where all of the new security risks of the post-
Cold War era are concentrated. This region is volatile due to protracted conflicts- 
particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict-, mutual distrust among the countries, the drive to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, smuggling, religious 
fundamentalism and terrorism. Because of its vast reserves of oil that amount to more 
than 60% of world oil reserves, the Middle East is at the center of great power interests 
which dictate the control of easy access and unabated flow of oil to ensure price stability, 
and decrease dependency on the regional states. The initiatives for peace have usually 
proven fruitless due to a number of intermingled issues ranging from land, security, 
water, terrorism and proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems.  
                                                 
12 Erol Mütercimler, “Security in Turkey in the 21st Century,” Insight Turkey, Vol.1, No.4, (Oct-Dec 1999), 
pp.16-17. 
13 Işıl Kazan, Turkey Between National and Theater Missile Defense, Raketenabwehrforschung 
International, Bulletin No. 25, Fall 2001. <http://www.hsfk.de/abm/bulletin/kazan1.htm>  
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The issue of proliferation is on the rise and is occupying the prominent place on 
the global agenda regarding the Middle East, demonstrated by the War on Iraq. The 
proliferation threat has emerged as the most significant threat since it has left Turkey 
under the risk of being affected in a regional conflict that would include a WMD attack as 
was exemplified by the Gulf War and then the War on Iraq. Before the War and generally 
before 9/11, Turkey was under a potential WMD and missile threat from Iran, pre-war 
Iraq and Syria. The threat perceptions from Syria and to a lesser extent Iraq was relatively 
lower, whereas Turkey has been growing increasingly uneasy about Iran’s nuclear and 
missile programs. Still, it counted on its military power and NATO collective security 
guarantee, though the latter seemed to have weakened in the post-Cold War. The War on 
Iraq and aftermath, however, inserted a new dynamic: The post-9/11 US security policy 
aims at getting rid of the anti-American and WMD-aspirant states in the Middle East, and 
views Turkey as a strategic location to carry out operations- military or other. Turkey has 
also experienced the prolonged discussions in NATO to guarantee its security in case of 
an Iraqi retaliation with WMD or missiles. The United States pointed at Iran and Syria as 
its next targets in the war against terrorism. Thus, their WMD and missile capability no 
longer constitute a potential risk, but a real threat to Turkey, especially after the wounded 
relations with the United States because of the War on Iraq, and the ensuing reluctance to 
challenge the fragile status of these relations, hence the drive to work together.  
Turkey has already given its response to proliferation in the Middle East by 
engaging in talks with the United States and Israel on anti-ballistic missile defense 
systems, but the talks are yet to be complete due to a number of issues. To understand 
Turkey’s threat perceptions from its neighbors in the Middle East both before and after 
 12 
 
the War, the next couple of sections will provide an analysis of Turkey’s security policy 
towards the Middle East and proliferation in general, and make a threat assessment by 
scrutinizing the capabilities and issues that may trigger the political intent to employ 
them. Then the following section will look at Turkey’s deterrent and defensive 
capabilities, and the responses it undertook. The aim is to understand and appreciate the 
response so as to link it with the possible problems in Turkey’s relations with the 
European Union. 
 
2.2. TURKEY’S SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
 
In the early years of the Republic, Turkey endorsed a foreign policy based on the 
maintenance of status quo, and distanced itself from the politics of the Middle East. After 
the end of Cold War, Ankara began to exert influence in the Middle East, representing a 
significant shift from the previous policies that were characterized as ‘cautious 
indifference’ based on its membership in NATO and its non-involvement policy with 
respect to Middle Eastern issues.14 The Gulf War drastically changed Turkey’s Cold War 
policy by forcing it to get involved in an inter-Arab conflict. During the War, Turkey's 
exclusive cooperation with the West, especially with the United States against Iraq, 
represented a fundamental change of Turkey's traditional balanced regional policy dating 
back to the 1960s, and it continued after the War.15 Turkey has concluded cooperation 
agreements on military training, technical aid, scientific matters and defense industry 
                                                 
14 A.L. Karaosmanoglu, 2000, op.cit., pp. 208-211. 
15 Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32 No. 4, 
October, 1996, p. 343. 
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with Israel in 1994 and in January and August 1996.16 Thus, both countries increased 
their strategic posture in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s 
strategic relationship with Israel formed a counterforce17 to the Greek threat in Aegean 
and Cyprus. 
In the Middle East, due to the mutual threat perceptions, there is the inclination to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. Basically, Israel started 
developing a nuclear capability in order to be able to defend itself against the Arab states 
in the region, which see Israel as the disrupter of stability and security in the Middle East. 
To attain parity with Israel, other states followed suit to acquire WMD. Since the 
acquisition of nuclear capability requires sophisticated research and financial resources, 
they resorted to acquiring chemical and biological weapons, which are sometimes 
depicted as “the poor man’s atomic bomb,” and missiles by the technology and know-
how they acquired from the great powers during the Cold War. At this point, it is 
necessary to define WMD, and the proliferation issues in the Middle East. 
WMD is defined as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Though they are 
grouped together as WMD, they differ in terms of the lethality of their effects. Nuclear 
weapons are the most destructive in that they kill large numbers of people, destroy 
buildings and infrastructure, and contaminate large areas with radioactive fallout. 
Biological and chemical weapons do not destroy buildings or infrastructure but target 
                                                 
16 Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, “Turkey, Israel Sign Industry Cooperation Deal,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, Vol. 26, 
No. 10, September 4, 1996; Yusuf Özkan, “Türkiye-İsrail Ortak Füze Üretimi Masada (Turkish-Israeli 
Joint Production of Missiles on Table),” Milliyet, 25 January 1998. 
17 The militarized Greek islands in the Aegean that present a potential threat of an aerial attack, and Greek 
Cypriot attempts to diminish Turkey’s strategic posture in the Eastern Mediterranean with the quest to 
acquire air defense systems propelled Turkey to augment its deterrent and defense capabilities in case of 
contingencies with Greece.   
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living organisms instead, that is, humans, animals and plants.18 WMD capability 
constitutes an imminent threat when those who possess them also have delivery 
capabilities. Along with the various means of delivery and dispersal, the proliferators 
usually seek to acquire ballistic missiles so that they can be certain of penetrating the 
opponent’s defenses.19  
A ballistic missile is a rocket capable of guiding and propelling itself in a direction and to 
a velocity that, when the rocket engine shuts down, it will follow a flight pattern to a 
desired target. Ballistic missiles burn most of their propellant (fuel) in the initial portion 
of their flight, called the boost phase. Most fly fast enough to hit targets 100s or 1000s of 
miles away in a few minutes. Once launched, they are fairly easy to detect with radar or 
other sensors, but difficult to intercept.20  
 
The Middle East has the highest concentration of WMD of the world, whose use 
can be easily triggered by ongoing tensions and protracted conflicts. The WMD programs 
expanded and the quality and quantity of their delivery systems increased in the last two 
decades. Various sources and reports indicate that Israel is the sole nuclear-capable state; 
Iran, Iraq, Israel and Egypt have chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programs; 
Syria has the most advanced chemical weapons (CW) capability in the region; Egypt, 
Iraq and Syria have short-range, Iran and Israel have medium-range ballistic missiles that 
can carry WMD warheads.21 Geographical proximity feeds mutual threat perceptions. 
There is a region-wide proliferation trend, which is “…driven by a variety of factors 
                                                 
18 “A Primer on WMD,” Nuclear Threat Initiative. <http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1a.html> 
19 “Ballistic Missiles/A Primer on WMD,” Nuclear Threat Initiative. 
<http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/f1a5.html> 
20 Ibid.  
21 See Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
<http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/index.htm>; Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, 
Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen, New York: 
Springer-Verlag, 2002; Mohamed Shaker, Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East, Keynote Address to PPNN 
International Workshop: Nuclear Weapons and the Middle East, Southampton, United Kingdom, 12-14 
October 1995; Khaled Dawoud, “Redefining the Bomb,” Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 458, 2-8 December 1999. 
<http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/1999/458/intervw.htm> 
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governing or generated by the security calculus of [the regional] states”.22 The region has 
seen WMD use and use threshold in many cases including the Iraqi use of chemical 
weapons against Iran and its Kurdish population, and the expectation of such use in Arab-
Israeli wars, as well as in the Gulf War of 1991 and Iraq War of 2003.  
The ongoing conflicts and tensions create actual or perceived threats and increase 
the likelihood of the use of WMD. They include first and foremost the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, which is the core of volatility and steady tension in the region; disputes over oil 
and water; and rivalry over regional or religious dominancy. Israel defines state security 
as a function of overwhelming capability over the regional adversaries, which challenge 
the existence of the state, such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Syria. Due to the lack of strategic 
depth, Israel resorted to acquiring utmost defensive capabilities, including nuclear, but 
did not announce them since the baseline is not prestige.  
The quest for regional dominance is a historical fact of the Middle East. Egypt, 
Iran and Libya have had the quest to be the regional or the cultural leader. In this view, 
the one who can challenge the Israeli security rules the Arab world. Thus, WMD 
capability would give them not only tactical military capability, but more importantly, 
prestige- hence the effort to acquire CBW capability. WMD and ballistic missile 
capability also would make up the gaps in their unsophisticated military forces, and 
enable them to penetrate the adversaries’ borders to win a conventional war. Thus, Egypt, 
Iraq and Syria did not sign the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to be able to 
develop and maintain chemical weapons against the Israeli capability. In order to 
maintain its nuclear opacity, Israel did not sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty 
                                                 
22 Nabil Fahmy, “Prospects for Arms Control and Proliferation in the Middle East, The Nonproliferation 
Review, Vol. 2, No. 8, Summer 2001, p. 6. 
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(NPT). The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) could not find many supporters 
from the region. 
Iran, pre-war Iraq and Syria have posed WMD and missile threat to Turkey. Iran 
and Syria have ballistic missiles that can hit military and civil targets in Turkey. Their 
military capabilities and the various issues in their relationships with Turkey constitute a 
real threat to Turkey’s security. Turkey has been concerned about Iraq and Syria’s 
possession of chemical and biological weapons and surface-to-surface missiles to deliver 
them. Particularly, reports of Iran’s effort to acquire a nuclear capability, and its 
development of long-range ballistic missiles alarmed Turkey23 since “… [its] population 
centers, dams, power stations, air bases and military headquarters are within the range of 
these missile systems.24 The impacts of 9/11 and War on Iraq exacerbated the threat, as 
mentioned above. 
Nonetheless, for Turkey, the threat posed by the proliferation of WMD is 
important while not one of the most discussed. Turkey has contributed to collective 
nonproliferation efforts: In this context, Turkey ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) in 1980 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999 (Turkey 
was among the first signatories of the Treaty). It signed the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972, and became a party to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) in 1997. With respect to export controls regimes regarding WMD 
and their delivery means, related materials and technologies, Turkey was among the 
                                                 
23 I. O. Lesser and A.J. Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean, RAND, 1996; 
Sıtkı Egeli, Taktik Balistik Füzeler ve Türkiye (Tactical Ballistic Missiles and Turkey), Turkish Ministry of 
Defense, The Undersecretariat of Defense Industry, 1993, cited in Kemal Kirişçi, “Post-Cold War Turkish 
Security and the Middle East,” MERIA, Vol. 1, No.2, July 1997: 
<http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a6.html> (August 30, 2003) 
24 Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, Turkey and NATO in a New Strategic Environment, Paper presented at the 
Conference on Mediterranean Security in the Post-Cold War Era, 1995 cited in Kirişçi (1997), op.cit. 
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founding members of the Wassenaar Regulation in 1996. It joined the MTCR in 1997, 
and in 1999 it became a full member of Zangger Committee, which is the first major 
agreement regulating nuclear exports by current and potential suppliers.25 Since 2000, 
Turkey is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group-supplier 
agreements to control nuclear and related exports, and to prevent the proliferation of 
chemical and biological weapons respectively.26   
 
2.3. THREAT ASSESSMENT 
 
 
State security can be under potential or real threat. Roughly, what determines 
threat is the resultant of motivations and capabilities. Capabilities are the military assets 
and infrastructure that a state holds. Capabilities can affect the military standing of a 
country, and give them an offensive or defensive potential. Thus, there are mainly two 
elements in threat assessment: technical capabilities and political intent to employ them 
militarily or as offensive means. There can be various reasons that underlie the intent, or 
trigger such intent, like mutual threat perceptions, issue areas between states or 
deterrence. This section aims at assessing the threat that Turkey incurs from the 
proliferation of WMD and missiles in its neighborhood. Capabilities are assessed on the 
basis of the quality (range, payload, efficiency, targeting) and quantity of weapons along 
with access to materials in order to develop and advance these weapons. Motivations are 
assessed on the basis of the political and strategic context of the region that can lead 
                                                 
25 Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2002, p. 29. 
26 White Paper, Turkish Ministry of Defense, Part II, Section 7. 
 18 
 
states to employ these weapons militarily (hypothetical scenario of an attack on strategic 
targets; missile tests, deployment of warheads in border areas).  
 
2.3.1. Missile Proliferation in Turkey’s Volatile Neighborhood 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, states in the Middle East that used to be its 
satellites became free to roam out of the orbit. They had developed WMD and missiles by 
the technology and expertise they acquired from great powers during the Cold War; 
however, they could not act freely in the bipolar world, because the superpowers would 
intervene into the affairs to put a lid on any adverse development. After the end of Cold 
War, this controlling mechanism vanished, and they could have easier access to material 
and information especially from the newly independent states (NIS), where the material 
and expertise became unemployed and became attractive to the aspirant states and/or 
groups.  
Turkey became increasingly anxious about the efforts by Iran, pre-war Iraq and 
Syria which developed chemical and biological weapon capabilities, had nuclear 
programs, and which were in an effort to acquire missiles and work towards increasing 
their ranges. Turkey became aware of the WMD threat in the Middle East during the Gulf 
War, after seeing Iraq’s use of the Scud-Bs and the Al-Hussein (extended range Scud-Cs) 
missiles and Iraq’s threat to use WMD. Moreover, in 1998 and 2000, Iran tested its long-
range Shahab-3 missiles, which can carry nuclear warheads. Iran’s nuclear reactor in 
Bushehr27 is so much of a concern to the nonproliferation efforts,28 since it places Iran at 
                                                 
27 Iran worked with German firms for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactors beginning from 1974 
until the Revolution in 1979. The reactors were bombed several times by Iraq during the First Gulf War. 
Then, Iran had been in search for western European firms for reconstruction, but it was halted by US 
pressure. Iran started to work with Russia for the completion of the reactor, and Russian experts are 
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a threshold to produce nuclear weapons. States question Iran’s need to have such a 
reactor while it has oil resources to support its economy. Also, Iran’s refusal to be 
transparent creates doubts as to whether it may have intentions other than the peaceful 
use of this nuclear energy. 
Turkey’s ongoing disputes with its neighbors and areas of disagreement, 
including, inter alia, support for terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, Turkey’s strategic 
relationship with Israel and the long-standing unresolved water disputes with Syria and 
Iraq, led to a real WMD threat on Turkey’s southeastern borders. Ankara became uneasy 
since it does not have adequate defense systems against WMD and ballistic missiles. By 
the beginning of 2000, the potential ballistic missile threat from Iran and, to a lesser 
extent, Syria, became a real problem for Turkey.  
States acquire WMD for a variety of reasons. A combination of these reasons 
motivates Turkey’s neighbors to develop WMD capabilities. WMD capabilities represent 
power and prestige for the states in the Middle East: for example, Saddam Hussein’s 
quest to be the first Arab leader with a nuclear weapon in order to challenge Israel and 
lead the Arab masses. These states also seek WMD in order to deal with regional threats 
or to have a deterrent capability in future regional conflicts (such as the Syrian drive to 
acquire chemical weapons against Israel). Finally, these states pursue chemical and 
biological weapon programs as a “second best option” to a nuclear weapon capability; 
                                                                                                                                                 
working in the facilities. Analysts assess that the Bushehr-1 power plant and cooperation with Russia 
would give Iran the legitimate ground to conduct research, obtain nuclear-related equipment and know-
how, and the ease to carry out covert weapons-related assistance and smuggling activities. Source: Andrew 
Koch and Jeanette Wolf, Iran’s Nuclear Facilities: A Profile, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998: 
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/iranrpt.pdf> (July 15, 2003) 
28 Two other facilities in Natanz (for uranium enrichment) and Arak (heavy water reactor), and the two 
suspected facilities that served to build the infrastructure for these two, have added up to the concerns. See 
Leonard S. Spector, “Iran’s Secret Quest for the Bomb,” YaleGlobal Online, 16 May 2003: 
<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1624> (August 25, 2003) 
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hence the term “poor man’s nuclear weapon” has been coined for chemical and biological 
weapons.29 Also, none of Iran, pre-war Iraq or Syria have been party to the MTCR, which 
constrains the signatories to develop missiles with 300 km range and 500 kg payload. 
To elaborate the points made so far, the thesis will first take a look at capabilities 
and motivations, then demonstrate the lack of Turkey’s defense systems to protect against 
these capabilities. 
 
2.3.1.1. Iran: 
Iran is a signatory to the NPT, CWC and BTWC. Iran has been developing its 
program to deliver nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. It has a large 
nuclear development program to construct power reactors for “peaceful purposes,” 
however, US and Israeli officials believe that Iran seeks to acquire capability to build 
nuclear weapons.30 Reports indicate that Iran possesses chemical weapons and has 
ongoing research for biological agents, and started developing them during the war with 
Iraq in 1980s. Iran has 25 M-7 (CSS-8) missile systems with 150 km range and 190 kg 
payload, 200 Scud-B missile systems that have a range of 300 km and 985 kg payload, 
and 150 Scud-C missile systems with a range of 500 km and 700 kg payload. In addition, 
Iran successfully tested its Shahab-3 ballistic missiles that have a range of 1,300-1,500 
km -i.e. covering Ankara in its firing range- and 700 kg payload. In addition, Iran is 
working on developing its Shahab-4 missiles with a range of some 2,000 km and 1,000 
                                                 
29 John D. Holum, “The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Challenges and Responses,” US 
Foreign Policy Agenda (USIA Electronic Journal), Vol. 4, No. 2, September 1999. 
<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0999/ijpe/pj29holu.htm> 
30 See Greg J. Gerardi and Maryam Aharinejad, “An Assessment of Iran’s Nuclear Capabilities,” The 
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, (Spring-Summer 1995), pp. 207-213; Koch and Wolf, 1998. 
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kg payload.31 Iran’s WMD capability constitutes a potential threat to Turkey and it has 
exposed Turkey's weakness in the field of air defense systems.  
 
Figure 1. Estimated Ranges of Iran’s Current and Potential Ballistic Missiles32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Iran-Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
<http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.htm> 
32 Proliferation Threat and Response, Office of Secretary of Defense, January 2001, p. 37.  
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The imminence of the threat becomes clearer within the context of the relations 
between Turkey and Iran. The Shahab series of missiles are important to Iran since they 
serve a variety of purposes, one of them being Turkey’s NATO membership and its close 
strategic alliance with Israel, which is interpreted by Iran as potential threats.33 Several 
issues have characterized Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkey became uneasy by Iran’s 
support to the PKK (Partiya Karkarani Kurdistan-Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which 
carried out subversive terrorist activities in Turkey. The relations also suffered from the 
reported Turkish strikes against PKK targets in Iranian territory. For the time being, the 
Kurdish problem does not seem to occupy the prominent place in the agenda of Turkish-
Iranian relations. Another issue area is rivalry for influence in Caucasus and Central Asia. 
Moreover, Turkey and Iran have mutually perceived their secular and Islamist state 
systems as a potential threat to the existing order within their borders.  
While Turkey is alarmed by Iran’s development of its Shahab missiles, Iran, on 
the other hand, is uneasy about Turkey’s growing strategic partnership with Israel. The 
most important issue which will dominate the relations is Iran’s WMD capability and its 
development of long-range ballistic missiles, as reported in the 2002 National Security 
Policy Document, which cited Iran as the chief threat due to its development of WMD. 
Moreover, the increasing US tone against Iran, and Turkey’s possible cooperation with 
the United States in such an undertaking makes Turkey a formidable target for Iran. 
 
 
 
                                                 
33 Amin Tarzi, “Iran’s Missile Tests Sends Mixed Messages,” CNS Reports, August 15, 2000. 
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/shehab.htm.> 
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2.3.1.2. Iraq: 
The discussion devotes attention to pre-war Iraq and post-war reconstruction 
process in order to provide the basis for an accurate analysis of Turkey’s responses to the 
proliferation threat in its neighborhood, and to understand the current threats and issues. 
 
Figure 2. Estimated Ranges of Iraq’s Ballistic Missiles34 
 
 
                                                 
34 Proliferation Threat and Response, 2001, op.cit., p. 39. 
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In terms of the development and use of nuclear weapons, Iraq singled out as the 
most imminent threat to international security because of the Iraqi leadership under 
Saddam Hussein. Though Iraq might not directly target Turkey, the threat to use WMD in 
the Middle East is critical to Turkish security. Evidence of Iraq’s WMD capability and its 
record in nonproliferation was alarming. It was estimated that Iraq could fabricate a 
nuclear weapon with sufficient amount of black market uranium or plutonium.35 In 
addition, it had acquired special nuclear weapon-related equipment clandestinely. It had a 
large number of experienced nuclear scientists and technicians. Until halted by the Allied 
strikes and UNSCOM inspections, Iraq was believed to have an extensive nuclear 
weapon development program that began in 1972, involved 10,000 personnel and had a 
budget totaling $10 billion.36 It retained nuclear weapons design, and it might retain 
related components and software. Moreover, it was suspected that Iraq might retain a 
stockpile of biological and chemical weapon munitions.37 After the War, Iraq leaned on 
developing chemical and biological warheads,38 and it retained the know-how that would 
enable it to reconstitute much of its previous WMD capability, once UN sanctions and 
weapons inspections were lifted. A significant blow was inflicted on Iraq’s ballistic 
missiles program during the Gulf War in 1991. Before the UN inspections, Iraq possessed 
Al-Hussein and Al-Abbas ballistic missiles, and it was reported to be capable of resuming 
its missile program, so it might still retain Scud-B and Scud-C missiles after the 
inspections. 
                                                 
35 Iraq-Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and  Missile Capabilities and Programs, Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iraq.htm> 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
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Apart from possessing these capabilities, Iraq used chemical weapons in 1988 
against its Kurdish population in Halabja, a small town near the Iranian border, and 
during the 1983-1988 against Iran. It also fired ballistic missiles against Iran during 1988. 
Iraq is a signatory to the NPT and the BTWC, which it signed in 1991 with US pressure. 
It did not sign the CWC. Iraq continuously violated its obligations under the NPT and 
BTWC, and the UNSC Resolution 687, which mandated the destruction of its WMD 
capability. 
 Turkey, like most of the other states in the immediate region and the periphery, 
was concerned about the Iraqi leadership, which sought developing a WMD capability to 
establish hegemony in the region. Saddam Hussein had the quest to be the first leader to 
have nuclear weapons in the Arab world. Apart from the Iraqi threat of WMD and their 
delivery means, Turkey might encounter the threat to use these weapons due to a number 
of issue areas with Iraq. Like Syria, Iraq has the problem over sharing the waters of the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers with Turkey. The Iraqi support to Kurdish terrorist groups 
was an issue in the agenda, however, since Iraq had its own Kurdish problem, its support 
was not as strong as that of Syria. Despite the risks posed by the Iraqi regime under 
Saddam Hussein’s leadership, Turkey was content with the disarmament of Iraq under 
UN control in lieu of a regime change effected by force, because the ruling regime was 
keeping the culturally and ethnically diverse Iraqis together and ensuring the regional 
balance that Turkey wanted to see.  
Turkey’s perceptions were based on a number of reasons: First, it saw a 
territorially and politically unified Iraq as a precondition for security and economic 
stability. Second, the memories of the 1991 Gulf War were still fresh in that Turkey did 
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not want to shoulder the same burden without concrete guarantees and economic aid to 
relieve the distress. Third, there was no immediate perception of a WMD threat. Turkey 
had assessed that Iraq would not use WMD against Turkey because Turkey could 
massively retaliate with its military power; however, the US aim to topple the Saddam 
Hussein regime could leave the use of WMD option open either against the United States 
or its allies. That is why, Turkey’s response to an operation in Iraq has been lukewarm as 
part of the US campaign against terrorism. The impacts of the aftermath of the operation 
are landmark, which the thesis will look at very soon. 
The 2003 United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspections Commission 
(UNMOVIC) inspections revealed that Iraq increased the range of its Al-Samoud 
missiles to 180 km, exceeding the 150 km-range limit. Moreover, there have been serious 
concerns about missing information in Iraq’s weapons declaration to the UN. However, 
the United States had believed that the UNMOVIC/IAEA (International Atomic Energy 
Agency) inspections would prove futile in detecting Iraq’s WMD program due to Iraq’s 
extensive network of concealment,39 and that Iraq would not refrain from resorting to 
chemical and biological weapons during the war.  
Pre-war Iraq’s possession and use of WMD has highlighted two different issues 
for Turkey: Turkey’s key role in US operations rendered it the closest available target of 
an Iraqi missile attack. An Iraqi decision to use ballistic missiles with chemical or 
biological warheads against Turkey would rest upon its assessment of Turkey’s 
retaliation to such an attack. Turkey’s most important advantage against the WMD threat 
                                                 
39 Interviews with former UNSCOM inspectors, Dr. Victor Mizin and Mr. Timothy McCarthy of the Center 
for Nonproliferation Studies, 2002. Also see Ibrahim al-Marashi, “How Iraq Conceals and Obtains its 
Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. 7, 
No.1, (March 2003). <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2003/issue1/jv7n1a5.html>. (April 1, 2003) 
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is its military force which is capable of operating over large distances in a short time.40 
This, in turn, constituted a strong element of deterrence against Iraq. In 1991, Iraq did not 
use WMD against Turkey during the Gulf War. In that context, one can argues that Iraq 
did not want to risk an all-out military response for a limited tactical advantage by using 
WMD. However, during the Iraq operation, Turkey was concerned that Saddam Hussein 
would not refrain from using WMD since the aim of the operation was to remove him 
from power. 
The Iraq crisis impacted Turkey’s strategic relationship with the United States in 
such a way that would affect Turkey’s decisions in post-9/11 US security policy in the 
Middle East. The crisis caught Turkey between its political priorities in its region and its 
strategic relationship with the United States, in which both sides failed to understand and 
appreciate the underlying needs and concerns for their respective demands. Thus, Turkey 
gave much less support to the United States in Operation Iraqi Freedom than the United 
States had foreseen, so relations have been marked by tension and suspicion.  
Both allies are now in a process of elevating the relations to the pre-crisis level. In 
this process, the Bush administration made clear that mending the ties would not tolerate 
Turkey’s deviation from US policies. By these remarks, the United States gave Turkey 
the message that “You are either with me, or will be alone while suffering the 
consequences of my undertaking.” More specifically, while Turkey was trying to 
approach Iran and Syria in order to form a common front against the Iraqi Kurds, it also 
                                                 
40 Some 500,000 fully equipped troops, the air power that recently added early warning and refueling 
aircraft, which increased the range and operational capability of the combat aircraft, (and the modernized 
navy with enhanced capabilities) give Turkey the assets and capabilities to invade parts of the enemy 
territory in a short time. Source: Ali Karaosmanoğlu and Mustafa Kibaroğlu, “Defense Reform in Turkey,” 
Istvan Gyarmati, Theodor Winkler, Mark Remillard and Scott Vesel (eds.) Post-Cold War Defense Reform: 
Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States, Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002, pp.143-144. 
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needs to pursue a cautious policy to mend its ties with its indispensable ally. Therefore, in 
post-9/11 US security policy in the Middle East, Turkey has little room for maneuver if it 
chooses not to work with the United States. This is going to be an important policy 
variable in assessing Turkey’s security policy in the new era and its implications. 
 
2.3.1.3 Syria: 
 
Syria does not have nuclear weapons, but surveys indicate that it has the largest 
and most advanced chemical weapon capability in the Middle East. Syria received 
assistance from the former Soviet Union, North Korea and some Western European 
nations to develop advanced chemical warheads.41 In addition, Syrian experts were sent 
to some former Soviet Union republics and North Korea for training about the production 
of biological weapons and fixing chemical warheads to missiles.42 Turkey has been 
restive about the missile potential of Syria, which has Russian-made 200 SS-21 Scarab 
missiles that have a range of 120 km and 480 kg payload; up to 200 Scud-B missiles with 
300 km range and 985 kg payload; 60-120 Scud-Cs with a 500 km range and 500 kg 
payload. Analysts agree that Syria considers Scud-C missiles to deliver chemical 
weapons in long-range.43 Syria is also developing indigenous production capability for 
accurate M-9s, and it has recently increased its domestic ballistic missile production.44 
                                                 
41 Eric Croddy, Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A 
Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen, New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002, p. 44. 
42 Metehan Demir, "Türkiye Füze Tehditi Altında (Turkey Under Missile Threat)," Hürriyet, January 23, 
1999, <http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/99/01/23/dunya/01dun.htm> 
43 Croddy, op.cit. 
44 David Fulghum, "Advanced Threats Drive Arrow's Future," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
October 12, 1998, p.56; Syria-Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities, Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/syria.htm> Also, see Syria’s Scuds and Chemical Weapons, 
CNS Issue Brief on Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East 
<http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/syrscud.htm> 
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Moreover, reports drew attention to the possibility that No-dong missiles, with a range of 
1,000 km, which are being jointly produced by Iran and North Korea, would be installed 
in Iran and Syria.45 If Syria based the No-dong missiles in Aleppo, they would even 
threaten İstanbul and other cities in western Turkey. 
  
Figure 3. Estimated ranges of Syria’s Ballistic Missiles46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Kemal Yurteri, “Turkish Military Commanders’ Meeting Noted,” Yeni Yüzyil, September 17, 1997, p.8. 
46 Proliferation Threat and Response, 2001, op.cit., p. 43. 
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Turkey’s relations with Syria have been marked by numerous issues that could 
escalate into armed hostility, as was the case in 1998, when Turkey deployed troops in 
the Syrian border to coerce Syria to give up harboring the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan. 
Syria heeded, and its support to the PKK decreased considerably though not vanished 
completely after it signed the Adana Protocol with Turkey in October 1998 regarding 
security cooperation, in which it pledged to work with Turkey instead of challenging the 
latter with creating security threats. The death of the Syrian President Hafez al-Asad in 
2000 also occupied Syria more with domestic politics. His successor, President Bashar al-
Asad, redefined Syrian policy towards Turkey in a more cooperative mood and the two 
countries signed a number of cooperation agreements. 
However, the issues that still remain unresolved continue to be the core of tension 
in Turkish-Syrian relations. These are the Syrian claims on the Hatay province in 
Turkish-Syrian border, and the problem over the use of the waters of Euphrates and 
Tigris rivers, which originate from Turkey and flow through Syria and then Iraq. Though 
Syria does not acknowledge, the Hatay issue is still part of the psyche of the Syrian unity. 
Syria has never accepted the plebiscite that led to the unification of Hatay with Turkey in 
1939. Most maps in Syria include Hatay within the Syrian borders. 
The water issue occupied the agenda for decades, and increasingly after late 80s 
and early 90s. Syria chose not to bring it to the table after 1998, but it is still quite uneasy 
about Turkey’s advances with its Southeast Anatolia Development Project, which seeks 
to harness the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for irrigation and hydroelectric 
power generation. Syria perceives Turkey as “controlling the tap” and that it could use 
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water as a weapon.47 As a matter of fact, it had used the PKK card against Turkey to 
induce the latter to release more water from the Euphrates river. The issue is in stalemate 
after the meetings of Joint Technical Committee48 came to a halt.  
More importantly, for Syria, Turkey’s strategic partnership with the United States 
and Israel is ominous. Thus, it has signed an agreement with Armenia in August 2001, 
and it is improving its ties with Russia.49  
 
2.3.2. Assessment 
Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors, namely Iran and Syria, possess short- and 
medium-range ballistic missiles and have large stockpiles of chemical and biological 
weapons, leaving Turkey with a real WMD threat. Turkey has also incurred the threat of 
Iraqi retaliation with missiles and/or WMD during the war, and the US policies towards 
Iran and Syria only increase Turkey’s concerns. The War on Iraq introduced new 
variables on the behavior of Turkey’s WMD-capable neighbors: First, by being a US 
target, they will have nothing to lose, because the United States will come for both 
regime change and disarmament. Second, they will put their best effort to induce Turkey 
to refrain from helping the United States in order to gain more time and squeeze the 
latter. Third, they will not have a restraint to punish Turkey if it lends support to the 
United States in an operation against their country. 
                                                 
47 These worries reached their peak when Turkey cut off the waters of the Euphrates river during the 
impoundment period of the Atatürk Dam in December 1989 and January 1990.  
48 Turkish and Syrian officials, as well as Iraqi counterparts met under Joint Technical Committee 
meetings, but the committee could not proceed with problematic issues since politics dominated the talks 
when parties could not agree on terms and definitions regarding the use of these waters. Turkey made a 
gesture to revitalize the technical talks between the two countries to address the water issue during the visit 
by the Syrian Prime Minister, Mustafa Miro in 2003, but no tangible move is at foresight. 
49 “Syria, Armenia Sign Military Accord,” Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 346, August 29, 2001. 
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The above analysis demonstrated that capabilities and motivations do exist to 
constitute a real proliferation threat to Turkey; not necessarily due to the issue areas 
between Turkey and the possessors, but due to regional conflicts that can draw Turkey in- 
one that was represented by the War on Iraq. At this juncture, the study will proceed 
towards the policies that Turkey needs to adopt and whether it took the necessary steps 
towards that end. To understand Turkey’s needs, the study will first look at Turkey’s 
deterrent and defense capabilities against the proliferation threat in its neighborhood, and 
then provide the policy options that are open in front of Turkey to address this threat.  
 
Turkey’s deterrent and defense capabilities 
The current available data suggests that Turkey does not have sufficient defense 
systems to counter the threat of WMD and their delivery means- that is, sufficient passive 
and active defenses, and a strategy for countermeasures against a WMD attack involving 
or including ballistic missiles.50 Turkey determined a countermeasure strategy in case of 
NBC contingencies as detecting and retaliating against facilities and launchers,51 
however, these launchers are usually mobile and hard to detect, so this strategy does not 
provide adequate defense. In terms of passive defenses, the Turkish Armed Forces has an 
NBC School in Istanbul, and an NBC battalion composed of five companies and seven 
brigades in Adapazarı.52. The deficiencies in NBC passive defense equipment are being 
made up.53 
                                                 
50 Interviews with members of the Turkish military, who wanted to be cited anonymously.  
51 K. Kirişçi, 1997, op.cit., p. 10. 
52 In the context of civil passive defense activities, the NBC School gives training to the General 
Directorate of Civil Defense (which is under the Ministry of Interior), The Ministry of Health, State Airport 
Administration personnel, and the fire brigades of municipalities. Moreover, there are studies done by the 
Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Rural Affairs, States Institute of Statistics, 
the Institute of Turkish Standards, and the Institution for Scientific and Technological Research of Turkey/ 
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Apart from its air force strike capability, Turkey’s NATO membership with the 
ensuing security guarantee is the most important deterrent against threats emanating from 
the Middle East.54 However, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, Turkey felt that 
NATO’s commitment was weakened. The 1991 Gulf War dramatically affected Ankara’s 
Middle East policy in that some allies were reluctant to extend NATO’s area of 
responsibility. Similarly, during the allied operation against Iraq, Ankara felt increasingly 
vulnerable when its demand for the operationalization of the NATO security guarantee 
led to prolonged debates and rifts in the Alliance. Before and during the War, Turkey 
worked on bolstering its defenses against Iraqi jets and missiles in case of an Iraqi 
retaliation during the operation in Iraq: Turkey’s NATO allies sent Patriot missile 
batteries,55 which were withdrawn after the end of the war. The talks with the United 
States and Israel on the procurement and production of missile defense systems are yet to 
be complete, the details of which will be given later in this study.   
After the end of the war in Iraq, the United States started increasing its tone 
towards Iran and Syria for their WMD capability and alleged support to terrorism. The 
War on Iraq wounded the relations between Turkey and the United States, and the latter 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Marmara Research Center,…etc. However, though these institutions have recorded strides in CBW 
defense, since there is no effective coordination among them, the impacts of their research have remained 
local, and could not attain the desired level. Derived from interviews with the members of the Turkish 
military, who would like to be cited anonymously. 
53 Karaosmanoğlu and Kibaroğlu, op.cit., p. 144. 
54 Kemal Kirişçi, “US-Turkish Relations:  New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership,” in Kemal Kirişçi 
and Barry Rubin, eds., Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, Lynne Reinner, 2000, 
p. 95. 
55 NATO sent three Dutch ground-based air defense Patriot batteries and they were deployed in 
southeastern Turkey on March 1, 2003. Source: NATO Defensive Assistance to Turkey, NATO official 
website, <http://www.nato.int/issues/turkey/index.htm>; See Turkish Armed Forces statement on the 
operationalization of the Patriot batteries at NTVMSNBC: “Awacs ve Patriotlar Operasyona Hazir (The 
Awacs and Patriot Ready for the Operation)” NTVMSNBC, March 12, 2003: 
<http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/205576.asp.>; During the war two more batteries were deployed in 
Turkey by the United States. Source: “The US to Deploy Patriot Missile Systems in Turkey,” NTVMSNBC, 
March 13, 2003: <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/205757.asp> 
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expects Turkey’s support in its policy towards these countries. Turkey is working 
towards elevating the relations to the pre-war level, as it seems the only viable way to 
maintain its security within the post-9/11 undertakings of the United States. Thus, Turkey 
seems likely to cooperate with the United States, especially after its application caused 
controversy in NATO for an allied shield to protect Turkey in case of a regional war that 
includes its Middle Eastern neighbors.  
The next section provides an analysis of Turkey’s options for responses to the 
proliferation of WMD and missiles in the Middle East, and evaluates the current state of 
response. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE ANALYSIS OF TURKEY’S RESPONSE TO WMD 
PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
 
This section provides a general framework of defense options as a response to 
military threats, and evaluates these options in terms of a number of criteria that would 
address the threat. Then, it looks at the responses that Turkey has already undertaken, and 
analyzes these policies to find out whether they directly address the threat.  
Next section shows Turkey’s options for response and assesses the pertinence of 
its current level of response towards proliferation in its neighborhood. 
  
3.1. TURKEY’S POLICY OPTIONS OF RESPONSE 
Military strategists envision three options for defense against a threat: passive 
defense, active defense and countermeasures. Active defense refers to efforts to prevent 
an attack, and passive defense includes measures and preparations in the target site to 
minimize the effects of such an attack. Countermeasures, on the other hand, are the 
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efforts or measures to prevent more attacks by the same assets and capabilities.56 In this 
context, Turkey has a few options, which will be evaluated with the following criteria: 
• Turkey’s need to defend its population, civilian centers and infrastructure which 
are within the range of the ballistic missiles of its neighbors, coupled with the 
uncertainty created by international terrorism; 
• Repercussions of a specific policy decision on Turkey’s relations with its 
neighbors. This leads to Turkey’s need to keep the balance in its regional and 
international relations; 
• Financial circumstances of Turkey: Turkey is recovering from an economic crisis 
and needs to meet the goals of its economic program; 
• Turkey’s international commitments, such as the MTCR criteria that put certain 
limits on missile purchases and technology transfers; 
• Effectiveness and sustainability of a specific policy decision: that the policy 
alternative directly addresses the issue and the undertakings within that policy can 
be sustained politically, economically and militarily; and 
• To avoid becoming a target, e.g. of international terrorism, or in case of a regional 
war that Turkey is not directly involved. 
 
Active defense: Involvement in missile defense systems.  
Active defense against ballistic missiles refers to acquiring missile defense 
systems to intercept ballistic missiles before they reach their targets. Missile defense 
                                                 
56 In this context, ballistic missile defense can be carried out by civil defense measures in the potential 
attack site, by efforts to intercept missiles such as cooperating with allies for a missile defense shield, and 
by countermeasures such as destroying material that is used in the attack. In general, an effective ballistic 
missile defense can be accomplished by putting into action all three-defense measures. See: Egeli, 1993, p. 
100. 
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systems can be roughly grouped according to which phase of the missile trajectory they 
intercept the missile, that is, boost-phase, mid-course phase or terminal phase.57 
Accordingly, different missile defense systems function using different types of 
technology and with different requirements. More complicated systems and more 
sophisticated capabilities are necessary to destroy warheads able to carry NBC weapons. 
Missile defense systems are more than just the anti-ballistic missiles: they include 
surveillance satellites, radar systems, battle management, command, control and 
communication systems, etc. Thus, they are expensive and require cooperation with 
regional or international allies.  
In 1999, the United States, and in 2003, NATO sent Turkey Patriot missiles58 and 
three Dutch ground-based air defense Patriot batteries59 respectively to offset the Iraqi 
missile threat. However, for the Turkish military, such a restricted lower tier system does 
not meet Turkey’s requirements for defense against ballistic missiles. Thus, Turkey 
prefers a more general concept of ballistic missiles and defense systems,60 one such as the 
Arrow Anti-ballistic missiles (ATBMs).61 The Turkish General Staff is participating in 
studies about the US missile defense project. Talks about missile defense systems are 
continuing with the United States and Israel at an increasing pace, especially after the 
post-9/11 US policy took shape in the Middle East. The details of these talks will be 
given soon in this study. 
                                                 
57 In the literature the phases are also divided into five: Launch, boost-phase, coasting flight, re-entry, and 
impact. 
58 Bill Gertz, "US Sending Patriots to Turkey over Iraqi Missile Threat," Washington Times, January 16, 
1999, p.2 
59 “NATO Defensive Assistance to Turkey: Operation Display Deterrence” NATO Official website, 
<http://www.nato.int/issues/turkey/index.htm> 
60 Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, “Army Defines New Missile Strategy,” Turkish Daily News, Feb. 9, 2000. 
61 For specifications, see Arrow TMD, Federation of Atomic Scientists: 
<http://ww.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/arrow.htm> 
 38 
 
Symmetric response: Acquire capabilities in kind.  
Turkey has a few purchased or domestically produced surface-to-surface missiles, 
the Project-J and MGM-140/Army Tactical Missiles (ATACMs). Project-J missile is able 
to match the range of Scud-C while remaining within MTCR limits.62 Turkey decided to 
acquire such capabilities as a reaction to the more sophisticated capabilities of its Middle 
Eastern neighbors and for tactical purposes. 
Military analysts63 argue that Turkey’s deployment of such missiles will not yield 
the desired deterrent effect, and, moreover, may have negative side effects. For example, 
after the 1991 Gulf War, ballistic missiles have become the symbol of attacks on civilians 
and of armament in excess of defense needs. The use of missiles in Operation Iraqi 
Freedom reinforced this perception. They argue that if Turkey continues with developing 
such missiles, this would tarnish its image in international forums, lead to other anti-
Turkish campaigns, and more importantly would undermine efforts for the 
nonproliferation of these missiles in the region. In addition, Turkey is constrained in its 
development of ballistic missiles by the MTCR criteria that prohibit the production of 
missiles that exceed 300 km of range and a 500 kg of payload. The repercussions for 
Turkey’s relations with its neighbors, particularly with Greece, would introduce new 
strains on issue areas,64 and could trigger an arms race at the regional level.  
The most important argument against the inclusion of ballistic missiles in the 
Turkish military inventory is that these systems are not cost effective, that is, they are 
expensive and suffer from tactical flexibility: They are costly to produce, but can be used 
only once unlike jetfighters which can perform a similar function along with other uses. 
                                                 
62 Ibid. 
63 Egeli, 1993, op.cit, pp. 90-91. 
64 Ibid. 
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Ballistic missiles have a strategic advantage of being difficult to intercept; however, this 
advantage is overwhelmed by the financial burden of their one time use. Since ballistic 
missiles form an offensive military capability, it is not possible to use them for defensive 
purposes, unlike fighter jets. And it should not be underestimated that Turkey has a 
relative superiority in terms of its air force vis-à-vis its Middle Eastern neighbors.65  
 
Asymmetric response: Threatening retaliation with different capabilities. 
Turkey would adopt the strategy of “punishment” to deter attacks, by threatening 
retaliation with an overwhelming military response. Turkey allocates around 3% to 4.2% 
of its GDP to military expenditures,66 and the Turkish military is among the biggest 
forces in the world,67 which has been the country’s chief deterrent against threats from 
the Middle East. Iran, pre-war Iraq and Syria do not have effective military forces, which 
led them to acquire and develop ballistic missiles. On the plus side, this policy would not 
put an additional burden on Turkey’s defense budget, which otherwise would be 
allocated for costly missiles or missile defense projects with yet to be resolved technical 
issues. However, Turkey’s population, civil centers and infrastructure would still remain 
vulnerable to an attack.  
 
Passive defense: measures that aim to minimize the impacts of a missile or WMD attack.  
In this context, Turkey can take civil defense measures such as preparation of 
potential attack sites, equipment to survive an attack and relevant education courses. 
                                                 
65 “Regional Military Balance-Eastern Mediterranean-10,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 28 June 
2001. 
66 See Defense Expenditures as of Gross Domestic Product, NATO website: 
<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/table3.pdf>; Karaosmanoğlu and Kibaroğlu, 2003, op.cit. pp. 155-156 
67 See CIA World Factbook online: <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> 
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However, it is impossible to guarantee a high level of effectiveness due to the size and 
population of the country. An effective undertaking is also too costly and time-
constrained in contingencies. Overall, passive defenses are necessary but insufficient 
measures. 
 
Countermeasures: prevent similar attacks with the same assets and capabilities.  
In case of a ballistic missile attack, Turkey defined a strategy to destroy WMD 
facilities and missile launchers, but its Middle Eastern neighbors have mobile launchers 
that are hard to detect and destroy. Other countermeasures include early warning and 
discovery platforms, augmenting the operational effectiveness of jetfighters with relevant 
equipment and making necessary arrangements in command and control systems. Like 
passive defenses, these measures are complementary, but not comprehensive. 
 
Prevention approach:  
To prevent an attack, Turkey can improve ties with its WMD- and missile-capable 
neighbors to decrease tension and the likelihood of conflict, or it can actively engage in 
nonproliferation regimes, especially those of export controls of missile technology and 
parts, fissile materials and dual-use items. Turkey is already a signatory to the relevant 
treaties and member of the groups working on export controls; however it does not have 
as much influence and standing as some other countries, like South Africa. Considering 
that the Turkish military is quite concerned about this issue, Turkey could attempt to 
become more effective in these regimes, particularly the MTCR and to convey its 
concerns in related platforms. Other measures can be to increase customs security at its 
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southeastern borders, to engage in diplomatic efforts to ease tensions with its Middle 
Eastern neighbors, and pursue cooperation in economic and/or technical matters. In fact, 
it adopted such a policy in its relations with Syria and Iran, and it tried to improve 
economic relations with Iraq despite the sanctions. The preventive approach is diplomatic 
aspect of defense policy, which is closer to that of the EU than the United States. 
Turkey has already adopted the first two alternatives, that is, it started getting 
involved in missile defense projects, and started acquiring ballistic missiles, which is a 
policy that is closer to that of the United States. The Turkish defense industry aims to 
minimize its dependency on foreign powers and supports cooperation with allies for the 
procurement of state-of-the-art technology. Turkey seems to attain these objectives by 
both domestically producing missiles and working with allies.  
This policy directly addresses the missile proliferation threat: Active defenses are 
the most effective responses to the threat or the actual use of missiles. Compared with 
Patriot anti-missile systems, Arrow ATBM technology would be a major asset in 
Turkey’s military arsenal, for it does not have an equivalent. Thus, missile defense 
systems at Turkey’s disposal would deter WMD and missile threats from the Middle East 
and in turn can facilitate Turkey’s involvement in other regional security frameworks. 
Basically, Turkey’s involvement in these projects with the United States is geared 
towards being included in such strategic ventures. The other side of the balance sheet 
cannot quite balance the positive aspects of involvement: Acquiring a missile defense 
shield that meets Turkey’s needs is very expensive: Analysts identified 33 potential 
targets in Turkey, and assessed a defense system to protect all these targets. Their 
findings are at Table 1: 
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Table 1. The cost of total defense procurement (billion $)68  
Complete Defense 
%80 %96 %99 
System Lower 
layer 
Higher 
layer 
Boost 
phase 
Low+
High 
Low+ 
Boost 
High+ 
Boost 
Low+High
+Boost. 
 
PAC-3 
Number of 
system 
22   22 22  22 
ARROW  8   8 8  8 
THAAD   9  9  9 9 
Airborne 
Laser   3-4  3-4 3-4 3-4 
Procurement 
cost 14.1 4.5 2.25-3 18.6 16.3-17.1 6.75-7.5 20.85-21.6 
Ten-year 
operation 
cost 
2.6 0.9 5.5 3.5 8.1 6.4 9 
Total cost 16.7 5.4 7.75-8.5 22.1 24.4-25.2 13.15-13.9 29.85-30.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, this policy heightens the risk of making Turkey a target, 
upsetting its neighbors and causing rifts in its security alliances. There are also technical 
issues in missile defenses yet to be resolved. Overall, considering that Turkey’s strategic 
posture will increase by its involvement in missile defense projects and defense systems 
                                                 
68 Osman Elmacı, “Türkiye’nin Füze Savunma Stratejisi (Turkey’s Missile Defense Strategy),” Master’s 
Thesis, Ankara: Turkish Military Academy, February 2003, p. 115.  
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procurement with the United States and Israel, Turkey’s current level of response is the 
most effective one to address the proliferation threat.69 The next section will provide the 
details of Turkey’s response. 
 
 
3.2. TURKEY’S RESPONSE 
 
The Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel and the display of its chemical and biological 
weapon capability demonstrated Ankara that it needed to augment its defenses against 
Middle Eastern threats. Turkey has been engaged in efforts to bolster its defensive 
capabilities, and either purchased or domestically produced surface-to-surface missiles. 
These are shown in the table below:  
 
Table 2. Missile Projects/Purchases 
 
Countries Missile 
projects/purchases 
Current status 
China Project-J Turkey developed the J-missile based on the 
Chinese M-7.  
US ATACMs Under Foreign Military Sales agreements, 
Turkey purchased 120 ATACMs for $132 
million. 
 
Project-J Missile:  
 
The J missile is a ballistic missile developed by Roketsan with Chinese assistance. 
It is a collaborative venture between Roketsan and CPMIEC (China Precision Machinery 
Import-Export Corporation) under a contract of about $360 million. Since it has a range 
of 150km, it is believed to be based on the technology from China’s M series of tactical 
missiles. The only known Chinese missile in the 150km performance is the CPMIEC M-
                                                 
69 Şebnem Udum, “Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: Turkey and Missile Defense,” Turkish Studies, 
Vol. 4 No. 3, Fall 2003. (Forthcoming) 
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7/Project 8610 (CSS-8). Given the missile capabilities of Turkey’s neighbors, it is 
possible that the announced range of 150km is less than the missile’s maximum range.70 
 Besides, it was reported that Turkey has already imported China’s 280-300km-
range DF-11/M11 (CSS-7), which is a solid propellant, single-stage missile, either as a 
complete system or a technology package. This missile could have formed the basis for a 
Project-J missile able to match the range of Scud-C while remaining within MTCR 
limits.71  
 
MGM-140/ Lockheed Martin Army Tactical Missile Systems Block I (ATACMs):  
In December 1995, the United States sold Turkey 120 ATACMs. These missiles 
have a range of 30-165 km and could be upgraded for a greater range.  
In 2001, Turkey purchased ATACM Block I missiles, which is a long-range 
guided missile that provides immediate firepower. Its maximum range is 165km and it 
has a 560kg payload. It contains 950 M74 antipersonel/antimaterial submunitions. IT was 
believed that the United States decided to sell ATACMs soon after the Project-J started: 
Unhappy with the Chinese assistance to Turkey and the pressure from Greece, the United 
States decided to sell ATACMs to Greece and provide the same missile to Turkey72-
presumably in order not to disrupt the strategic balance in eastern Mediterranean.  
After the Gulf War of 1991, Turkey began to keep close watch on developments 
in the Middle East. The long-range missile development of Iran made Turkey 
increasingly anxious and led Ankara to contemplate a defense concept against long-range 
missiles. Thus, Turkey started to become interested in the US missile defense project and 
                                                 
70 Utku Çakırözer, “Turkey Tests ‘Project J’ Missile,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, February 2002. 
71 Ibid; Project-J is highly confidential and further information is not available in the short-run. 
72 Utku Çakırözer, “Turkey Tests ‘Project J’ Missile,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, February 2002. 
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welcomed the Israeli offer to help establish a missile defense umbrella that would include 
the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system.73 As part of a broader defense strategy, Ankara 
aims to participate in the production of Arrow-2 missiles, which have been developed 
jointly by the United States and Israel. 
 
3.3. TURKEY’S INVOLVEMENT IN MISSILE DEFENSE PROJECTS 
 
3.3.1 The Missile Defense Project of the United States: 
 
Proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles is a global threat indeed. The end of 
the Cold War introduced the threat of missile launches by states with WMD capability, 
and efforts to defend against them ensued. The (National) Missile Defense (NMD) is the 
last project of the US plans to deploy a missile defense system to defend the homeland 
against ballistic missile attacks. In the 1960s, the United States employed ‘Sentinel’ or 
‘Safeguard’ systems against the risk of a Soviet missile attack. During the 1980s, 
President Ronald Reagan introduced ‘Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)’, dubbed “Star 
Wars”, that would render a Soviet strike on the United States ineffective. At the end of 
the Cold War, President Bush (Senior) and Russian President Boris Yeltsin started a 
program called ‘Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). However, the 
Clinton administration rejected the plan and started conducting research for building 
Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) that would protect US forces during military operations 
overseas (especially after the Iraqi Scud attacks in Gulf War). The threat of a deliberate 
attack from an emerging missile state, such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea, became the 
                                                 
73 Arieh O’Sullivan, “Turkey Welcomes Joint Missile Defense Offer,” The Jerusalem Post, July 10, 2001, 
p. 1. 
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primary rationale for the deployment of missile defenses. Then, the administration 
committed itself to the development of a system capable of defending US territory 
against long-range missiles fired from different continents armed with NBC warheads. 
Lately, President G. W. Bush expanded the context as to provide security to allies and to 
deployed forces around the world. 
On the economic front, the cost of the project, including protection for US allies, 
is some $200 billion, for which the United States expects contributions from the involved 
states. However, European allies are reluctant to invest in the project because of several 
economic and political reasons. The project also faces some technical challenges. 
Originally, the (National) Missile Defense system was designed to destroy hostile missile 
warheads in the midcourse phase of the missile trajectory.74 It featured the hit-to-kill 
intercept, in which interceptors would collide with the warhead and destroy it.75 The 
challenge emerged in detecting the warhead, which might contain bomblets filled with 
biological or chemical agents as well as decoys. Thus, the hit-to-kill concept has proven 
to be very difficult to operationalize.76  
 Therefore, the Bush administration articulated the “boost-phase missile defense,” 
whereby a ballistic missile would be destroyed during the boost-phase of its flight. It 
offers advantages over the mid-course intercept, such as the ability to destroy the entire 
                                                 
74 The mid-course phase of a ballistic missile trajectory refers to the stage where the ballistic missile is 
burned out and has released its warhead, but the warhead has not yet re-entered the atmosphere. 
75 Actually, the main task was to be carried out by satellites, which would detect the exhaust cloud of the 
ballistic missile and track the missile with radars that would detect the warhead, and with a communication 
system, which would direct this information to a command center that would order the launch of ground-
based interceptors. See Charles A. Glaser and Steve Fetter, “NMD and the Future of US Nuclear Policy,” 
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 49-50. 
76 Andrew M. Sessler, John M. Cornwall, Bob Dietz, Steve Fetter, Sherman Frankel, Richard L.Garwin, 
Kurt Gottfried, Lisbeth Gronlund, George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol, David C.Wright, 
Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National 
Missile Defense System, (Cambridge, Mass: Union of Concerned Scientists and MIT Security Studies 
Program, 2000), pp. 168-171, cited in Glaser and Fetter (2001). 
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missile payload (including the warhead and possible other decoys), to cause the missile to 
fall close to the launch site (thus resulting in little or no damage to the intended target), 
being able to detect and track the missile more easily (since a burning missile booster is 
brighter, larger, slower and more fragile than a warhead), and to be able to cover a much 
larger area than a midcourse defense (thus enabling the defense of US allies in Europe 
and Asia).77 In addition, this system is technologically and financially more feasible than 
the proposed mid-course NMD system. The main difference of the boost-phase defense is 
that the system must be positioned near the opponent’s launch site, either in neighboring 
countries or on ships patrolling nearby.78  
In the Middle East, regarding WMD and missile proliferation, Iraq and its 
leadership under Saddam Hussein was the primary concern of the United States. To 
destroy Iraqi missiles with surface-based boost phase interceptors would require 
favorable geography, and they could best be destroyed by interceptors based in southern 
Turkey. Therefore, the United States envisaged a role for Turkey in the Missile Defense 
project, that is, to provide necessary bases to deploy interceptor missiles in its eastern and 
southeastern regions to destroy ballistic missiles fired by Iran or pre-war Iraq soon after 
they are launched. For the United States, Turkey’s cooperation is a priority matter for its 
new policy in the Middle East after 9/11. Apart from its material support, Turkey can 
give political support to Missile Defense in NATO in the sense that it straddles Europe 
and the Middle East and follows regional developments very closely,79 thus it can explain 
                                                 
77 Glaser and Fetter (2001), p. 53. 
78 Theodore Postol, “Hitting Them Where It Works,” Foreign Policy, No. 117 (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 
132-7; see Richard L. Garwin, “Boost-Phase Intercept: A Better Alternative,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 
30, No. 7 (September 2000), pp. 8-11. 
79 “Who is Afraid of Missile Defense?” Wall Street Journal Europe, July 10, 2000 < http://www.security-
policy.org/papers/2000/00-F42.html>; “US Plans to Deploy Defense Missiles on Turkish Land,” Turkish 
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the risks to European security better than any other European ally. The next section 
details Turkey’s views about being involved in missile defense systems. 
 
3.3.2. Turkey’s Stance Towards Missile Defense: 
Turkey’s most notable response to missile proliferation threat in the Middle East 
has been to seriously consider involvement in missile defense projects. Turkey first learnt 
about (National) Missile Defense in 1997, and the Turkish General Staff and the Foreign 
Ministry evaluated the project jointly. In 1999, Turkish officials participated in 
simulation exercises and joined working groups formed by the US military authorities. 
They reached an assessment about the project reflecting Turkey’s perceptions and stance, 
the main points of which follow. 
First, in principle Turkey is in favor of the project. Considering the risks and 
threats in its neighborhood, Turkey is one of the countries that would need such a shield 
in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, Turkey remains concerned about the 
reactions in certain capitals to its involvement in the project. In particular, the missile 
defense strategy could lead to tensions with Russia and China. Thus, a US attempt to 
alleviate Russian concerns might result in a change in the 1990 Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Treaty. While Russia favors a modification to serve its interests in the 
Caucasus region, Turkey wants to keep it intact due to the “exclusion zone” clause, which 
implicitly acknowledges Turkey’s security interests in the Middle East.80 
                                                                                                                                                 
Daily News, June 1, 2001; Ferai Tınç, “Yeni Savunma Mimarisinde Turkiye’nin Rolü, (Turkey’s Role in 
the New Defense Architecture),” Footnote /Hürriyet, June 4, 2001, p.24. 
80 Turkey obtained “an exclusion zone” in the CFE negotiations. This zone designates the area not covered 
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The related military advantage that would prompt Turkey to oppose a change is 
Turkey’s new Land-Air Forces Doctrine, which took shape after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the Gulf War of 1991. The Turkish military shifted its focus to its 
eastern and southern borders, and redeployed troops and military equipment. As a result 
of the rearrangement, “…the operational capability of the ground forces in combination 
with the air units g[a]ve Turkey the capability to conduct large-scale military operations 
deep into the territories of its southern neighbors, if need be for retaliatory purposes, in a 
considerably short time.”81 Thus, involvement in the missile defense project should not 
limit Turkey’s new doctrine, which constitutes a real deterrent for its neighbors.82 
Overall, the establishment of such a system should not limit the capabilities of Turkey’s 
own forces.  
Turkey is also concerned about the reactions from regional capitals regarding 
Turkey’s involvement in missile defense systems. Regional tensions between Turkey and 
its neighbors could lead to an arms race and polarization, which would create significant 
problems. In this respect, the attitude of Athens is particularly important: Greece 
perceives Turkey as its primary security threat and is therefore alarmed by any 
improvement in Turkey’s military capabilities. A missile defense system established 
outside the framework of NATO would disrupt the military-strategic balance in 
Southeastern Europe, which would tempt Greece to employ countermeasures, particularly 
within the context of decisions regarding EU enlargement and European security. Turkey 
was especially cautious from June 2002 to June 2003, since Greece conducted the affairs 
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related to European security and defense policy, and held the EU Presidency from 
January to June 2003. Considering that Athens is already uneasy about the growing 
Turkish-Israeli partnership in defense matters, Ankara expected Greece to use all 
available means to apply pressure.  
In general, Turkey would prefer a missile shield be created as a project of the 
North Atlantic Alliance in which all NATO members would participate on the basis of 
the 1998 NATO-approved plan to include a layered missile defense as part of NATO’s 
military operations. Turkey would not like to see a rift develop in NATO as a result of the 
missile defense issue. Specifically, the Turkish Foreign Ministry has urged the 
government to focus on joining a missile cooperation umbrella provided by NATO (or in 
a European framework). On the other hand, the Turkish military feels that it is very 
convenient to obtain a missile defense system from either Israel or the United States,83 
which is why Turkey is increasing its involvement with these states in a Middle Eastern 
TMD project. For Turkey, TMD is rather a long-term need.84 Turkey’s missile defense 
architecture is composed of systems for land-based early-warning and tracking as well as 
command and control. “…Turkey’s missile defense concept envisages expanding its 
capabilities with the deployment of theater missile defenses (TMD) with a view to 
protecting all military, economic and strategic targets together with the entire population 
in the country.”85 
Therefore, Turkey has some reservations about whether the missile shield would 
also protect Turkey and how important Turkey’s defense would be in the overall missile 
defense strategy. Former Deputy Chief of Staff (Ret.) Gen. Çevik Bir explained this 
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position by arguing that if the boost-phase intercept program w[ould] be able to 
neutralize short- and medium- range missile threats against Turkey, then Turkey w[ould] 
be willing to give support to the project. “However, if [this] capability is aimed at 
[intercepting] only long-range missiles, the proposed system may not complement 
Turkey’s missile defense architecture and a ‘positive approach to the issue’ may become 
impossible.”86 Bir also recommends that “…top US officials brief Turkey on this project 
on a ‘first-hand basis’.”87  
A related important question for Turkey is whether it will have the right to use the 
missile defense system in defense of its national interests, an issue of command and 
control. This question remains whether Turkey is involved in a missile defense system 
under a NATO umbrella or part of a theater missile defense system in the Middle East. In 
the first case, different threat perceptions concerning the European capitals would be one 
of the main stumbling blocks facing effective command and control. The second case, 
which seems more likely than the former, would have negative repercussions in the 
Eastern Mediterranean if Turkey were to be given command and control. On the other 
hand, to deny Turkey this right would create doubts about the viability of involvement. 
By ending the post-Cold War period, the 9/11 attacks have had a serious impact 
on Turkey’s stance towards missile defense involvement. First, Turkey has started to 
include terrorism as an important variable in its decision to allow American military 
equipment to be deployed in its territory. Second and related to the first one, after 9/11, 
the Turkish military decided to slow down the pace of missile defense cooperation with 
Israel and the United States. Third, considering the cost of the project, Turkey did not 
                                                 
86 Ret.Gen. Çevik Bir, “Whom Will the US Missile Shield Protect?” Ulusal Strateji (National Strategy), 
(September-October 2001), pp. 50-51. 
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find it appropriate to spend billions of dollars on missile defenses during its recovery 
from an economic crisis. On the other hand, the United States urged Turkey to deploy 
missile defense batteries for the operation in Iraq. The discussions regarding that request 
reinvigorated talks with the United States and Israel regarding anti-ballistic missile 
systems. 
Turkish defense officials have reportedly determined that Turkey needs a 
sophisticated missile defense system, like the US-Israeli joint production Arrow anti-
ballistic missiles to, defend vast territories, as opposed to other systems capable of 
defending only relatively small areas.88 Thus, the acquisition of the Arrow ATBM system 
has started to constitute a significant part of Turkey’s strategic planning. However, rather 
than simply buying the Arrow systems, Turkey prefers to participate in their co-
production in order to establish a certain infrastructure on anti-ballistic missile 
technology. So, a process of detailed discussions began with the United States and Israel 
on missile technologies and architecture. The next section will provide the details of these 
discussions. 
 
3.3.3. Strategic Cooperation: Talks with Israel and the United States: 
Turkish security analysts agree that effectively countering the proliferation of 
WMD and ballistic missiles requires enhancing Turkey’s air power, for which it is 
necessary to procure advanced assets and modernize the existing military equipment of 
the Turkish Air Force. Due to its “poor human rights records,” Turkey encountered 
difficulties in purchasing military hardware from Europe. Therefore, it turned to the 
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United States and Israel, and developed strategic relationships to address common 
security challenges in the Middle East. Turkey and Israel signed a military cooperation 
agreement which includes, inter alia, strategic cooperation and preparations against the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles and the threats posed by countries such as pre-war Iraq 
and Iran.  
Turkey’s defense circles have a number of reasons to prefer Israeli defense 
industries. They cite certain advantages, such as high-level, US-based technology, a 
willingness to share information and benefits from development, and readiness to involve 
Turkish firms in the production process.89 Israel and Turkey have signed nearly two-
dozen defense cooperation, free trade, and military training agreements since 1993. 
Military agreements between the two countries allow Israeli pilots to train in Turkey’s 
vast air space, provide Turkey with reliable access to sophisticated Israeli and US-
produced weapons systems, and enhance Israel’s ability to collect intelligence on Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria. Overall, the deterrent power and maneuverability of both states 
significantly increased as a result of this strategic cooperation.  
Israel perceives Iran as the biggest threat in the region with its Shahab series of 
missiles. Thus, it seeks an ambitious system to counter the ballistic missile threats 
emanating from Iran. This requires a layered defense that includes the Arrow ATBMs for 
intercepting incoming ballistic missiles90 and a boost-phase intercept element to detect 
                                                 
89 “PM to Turkey Today for Strategic Talks,” Ha'aretz, Aug. 28, 2000. 
90 “The Arrow-2 system can detect and track incoming missiles as far away as 500 km and can intercept 
missiles 50-90 km away. The Arrow-2 uses a terminally-guided interceptor warhead to destroy an incoming 
missile from its launch at an altitude of 10-40 km at nine times the speed of sound.” See Arrow TMD, FAS. 
<http://ww.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/arrow.htm> 
 54 
 
and destroy mobile launchers.91 Turkey needs a medium and long-range missile defense 
system against Iranian missiles.  
In 1988, the United States and Israel began to develop the Arrow series of 
ATBMs. The Arrow-2 missile is intended to defend Israel’s military assets and civilian 
centers as well as to support the US technology base requirements for advanced 
technologies “…that could be incorporated into the US theater missile defense 
systems.”92 In 1998, the head of Israel’s Ministry of Defense Export Department 
(SIBAT) and Israel’s deputy for defense industries signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) with Turkey’s Ministry of Defense, for the two countries to study 
jointly Turkey’s need for an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system based on the 
US-Israeli Arrow ATBM.”93 Since the beginning of 2001, the United States has actively 
participated in the talks Turkey and Israel have engaged on the idea of establishing a joint 
missile defense shield.94  
Assessing the threat in its immediate neighborhood and conscious of its 
geopolitical significance, Ankara has pressed Washington since 1998 for formal missile 
defense cooperation with Israel based on the Arrow system.95 Though Israel and Turkey 
had agreed in principle to the joint production of Arrow missiles, the United States 
opposed Turkey’s involvement on the basis of the MTCR limitations96, because it faced 
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the challenge of transferring capabilities without releasing the technologies for 
manufacturing them.97 As a result, Turkey and Israel agreed on the development of a new 
missile, which would resemble the Arrow, but would comply with the MTCR criteria.98 
Until 2001, the United States continued to oppose Turkey’s participation in the joint 
production of Arrow missile systems.99  
In late 1999, Turkey proposed that the missile defense system project be 
developed within NATO to defend against threats emanating from the Middle East. The 
United States in turn expressed that it would be more fruitful to conduct the work in a 
bilateral framework.100 Consequently, a US-Turkish bilateral working group on Theater 
Missile Defense (TMD) was established and Turkish officers participated in simulation 
exercises as part of this process.  
Parallel to the development of strategic cooperation with Israel, it was reported 
that Turkish military and civilian strategists tackled missile defense systems against the 
threat from the Middle East. One group supported acquiring an offensive missile 
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system.101 Another group preferred continuing to develop an antiballistic missile system 
with the United States bilaterally, while still another favored joining an ongoing anti-
missile project within NATO. The last group opposed the idea of a limited anti-missile 
system, and instead proposed the development of a quadripartite regional antiballistic 
missile system, involving Turkey, Israel, Jordan and the United States. The common 
denominator among all these views was to obtain defensive systems of antiballistic 
missiles in cooperation with the United States and Israel.102  
Realizing that the Arrow missiles would constitute a major asset in its military 
arsenal, Turkey preferred to deepen the strategic ties with Israel. Finally, the then Deputy 
Chief of the General Staff, General Edip Başer, announced Turkey’s preference for a 
regional antiballistic missile system at the High-Level Defense Group meeting with US 
officials in Washington in April 2000.103 Previously, the Foreign Ministry had diverged 
from the position of the General Staff, worrying that it would make Turkey’s Middle 
Eastern neighbors uncomfortable, until Iran successfully tested its 1,300 km range 
Shahab-3 missile in July 2000.104 
As a result, Israel, Turkey and the United States held TMD meetings in December 
2000 in Washington and in summer 2001 in Tel Aviv. Turkey stressed the importance of 
missile defense and described the missile threat in the region as real and potentially very 
dangerous. It should be noted that Israel and Turkey perceive Iran as the most imminent 
threat, while, for the United States, it was Iraq. Turkey emphasized that the system should 
also enhance Turkey’s security or it would not consent to becoming a target by deploying 
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the system. The United States assured Ankara that it would provide assistance to build a 
missile to alleviate Turkey’s regional concerns, while deploying longer-range missiles in 
Turkey to address US concerns.105 Thus, it was intended that the TMD would be a part of 
a larger missile defense.106 However, the 2001 financial crisis affected Turkey’s defense 
budget and led to delays or reschedules in various projects, among them missile 
defense.107 
In June 2001, Israel, Turkey and the United States reached an understanding on 
trilateral cooperation regarding missile defense for the first time.108 In the meantime, 
various reports cited Turkish intelligence reports, which indicated that Iran’s 
development of its Shahab series of missiles had reached an alarming level, and that the 
CIA further warned Turkey and Israel about the missile capabilities of Iran and Iraq. The 
Turkish military also issued a new national security policy statement that supported 
developing ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors.109 
After the events of 9/11, it was reported that officials from the Turkish military 
and the Foreign Ministry, and several academics reevaluated Turkey’s participation in the 
US Missile Defense project, especially in light of the fact that the attacks increased 
Turkey’s geo-strategic significance. The military urged the adoption of a more cautious 
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approach in order not to become a target of international terrorism or to upset Turkey’s 
neighbors. They argued that Iran, Iraq and Syria have always been a potential threat, but 
that at that time, there was no imminent threat emanating from the region. The National 
Security Council instructed Turkey to wait for the new US policy in the region, and that 
if Turkey decided to join such a system, it must do so without being totally dependent on 
the United States.110  
In the beginning of 2002, officials from Turkey and Israel met in Ankara and Tel 
Aviv for Arrow ATBM project talks to make progress towards jointly producing Arrow-2 
missiles. During these meetings, it was reported that they agreed to meet periodically to 
discuss and advance the project.111 Following the meeting, the Turkish Armed Forces 
adopted the “Aerospace and Missile Defense Concept” as part of plans to establish a 
National Space Board, which would form the legal basis for Turkey’s efforts to acquire 
ballistic missile systems. In March 2002, Turkey and the United States completed the 
first phase (security concerns until 2005) of a bilateral missile defense study designed to 
identify Turkey’s defense needs and the system(s) that could best meet them, and they 
entered the second phase, which would examine scenarios up to 2010 and then to 2015.112 
As of 2003, Turkey and Israel are working on the procurement of Arrow missiles 
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bilaterally, since the systems are no longer produced jointly by the United States and 
Israel, but only by the latter; so the deal is expected to be finalized by the two.113  
In the meantime, the Jerusalem Post reported that Turkish anxiety increased after 
intelligence reports of Iran’s missile tests to extend the range of its Shahab-3 and its 
development of the Shahab-4, which had reached alarming levels.114 In response to Iran’s 
Shahab-3 missile test in June 2002, the Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hüseyin 
Diriöz, stated that Turkey brought its sensitivity to the attention of Iran.115 In August 
2002, Turkey issued the new Security Policy Document, which focused on threats from 
Turkey’s neighbors with the largest missile and WMD programs in the region, and cited 
Iran as the chief military threat.116  
As the war trumpets in Iraq raised debates about defenses against WMD and 
missile attacks in July 2002, American experts came to Turkey to work on the US missile 
defense project. They discussed the prospect of deploying PAC-2 anti-missile systems in 
Turkey, and urged Turkey to increase its defenses of strategic and industrial facilities.117 
The United States gave Turkey classified briefings on Iraqi threats, and urged it to deploy 
surface-to-air missile batteries.118 Thus, Turkey stepped up efforts to counter the ballistic 
                                                 
113 M. Demir, January 6, 2002, op.cit; Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu, “Israel to Brief on Arrow-2,” Jane’s Defense 
Weekly, January 16, 2002. Also confirmed by Israeli officials who would like to be cited unanimously. 
114 Metehan Demir and Arieh O’Sullivan, “Turkish Intelligence: Iran to Start Building Long-Range 
Missile,” Jerusalem Post, May 15, 2002. 
115 “Turkey Expresses Concern Over Iranian Missile Test,” Turkish Daily News, June 6, 2002. 
116 “Düşman Önceliği Değişiyor mu? (Is the Ranking of Hostile Countries Being Revised?)” Milliyet, 
August 2, 2002, p. 14; “Turkey, Syria Sign Military Training Technical Cooperation Agreement,” NTV, 
June 19, 2002; “Iran, Iraq are in: Syria is out in Turkish Threats,” Middle East Newsline, Vol. 4, No. 290, 
2002.  
117 “US Helps Turkey Prepare for Offensive against Iraq,” Geostrategy-Direct.com. 
<http://www.geostrategy-direct.com/geostrategy-direct/secure/2002/8_13/2.asp>; “Türkiye’ye Patriot 
Füzesi (Patriot Shield for Turkey),” Hürriyet, July 31, 2002, p. 20. 
118 “US Helps Turkey Prepare for Offensive against Iraq,” Geostrategy-Direct.com. 
<http://www.geostrategy-direct.com/geostrategy-direct/secure/2002/8_13/2.asp> 
 60 
 
missile threat for the operation in Iraq,119 and deployed eight early-warning systems on 
the border against Iraqi missiles and jets.120 The Turkish General Staff (TGS) also 
prepared a wish list of equipment, in which the establishment of a regional missile 
defense system came second (after attack helicopters and military assistance) without a 
specific name for the missile.121  
It has become increasingly clear that Turkey needs and demands a shield against 
the ballistic missile threat from the Middle East. It is believed that after Iraq, the next 
target of US policy in the aftermath of 9/11 is likely to be Iran, and an Iranian retaliatory 
attack on Turkey can have more devastating impact than that from Iraq, taking into 
account the NBC capabilities of Iran. Therefore, Turkey’s need for a medium and long-
range missile defense system becomes clearer. 
Sıtkı Egeli underlines that all types of defenses should be employed in order to 
provide the most accurate defense against missile threat.122 Thus, Turkey needs to 
undertake other complementary measures and policies to have adequate defenses. 
However, even at this stage, Turkey’s overall response to address prominent threats 
emanating from the Middle East introduces policy problems in other aspects of Turkish 
foreign policy, namely for its relations with the EU. This issue was first highlighted by 
Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu, in his article “Turkey’s Security Perception from the East: A 
Roadblock in its March Toward the West?” The remainder of this study devotes 
particular attention to his findings, and aims at addressing the issues identified by Dr. 
Kibaroğlu. To understand the underlying reasons of the apparent problem, the following 
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chapter will tackle this issue in depth by first looking at the background of relations 
between Turkey and the EU, their current status, and the challenge that Turkey’s 
response to threats from the Middle East will pose to the course of these relations. The 
aim of the last chapter is to determine policies that would satisfy the needs, and alleviate 
the concerns of both Turkey and the EU, that is, to attain win-win solutions.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
IMPACTS OF TURKEY’S SECURITY POLICY ON ITS 
ACCESSION PROCESS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
 
 
 
4.1. BACKGROUND OF TURKISH-EU RELATIONS 
 
Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, integration with Europe has been 
the state policy and objective as an inertial extension of the Turkish quest to be part of 
Europe, which dated back to the 19th century. Becoming a part of the modern, 
industrialized world represented by Europe was a goal set by the founders of the country. 
M.K. Atatürk defined Turkey’s leaning as “reaching the level of contemporary 
civilizations” by which he meant the modern world that referred to Europe. For Turkey, 
being “European” not only refers to working together with the Europeans in the political, 
economic and security domain, but also it is a matter of identity that will be certified by 
membership in the “Club of Europeans”. 
After the end of World War II and the onset of polarization, Turkey chose the 
West since its geography does not let itself to remain non-aligned; and it remained apart 
from the politics of the Middle East. It became a member of NATO, the Council of 
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Europe, the OECD and the CSCE/OSCE. As a following step, Turkey wanted to work 
with the European Communities (EC) soon after their establishment in 1957 with the 
Rome Treaties, and it filed its application in 1959.  
The Ankara Agreement, which was signed in 1963 and entered into force in 1964, 
established an association between Turkey and the European Economic Community 
(EEC), which envisaged a progressive establishment of a Customs Union (CU) and 
aimed at Turkey’s full membership to the EC/EU. The Additional Protocol of 1970 
provided the details of how the CU would be set up.  
1980s were a period of a series of changes in Turkey. Turkey shifted to liberal 
economy, and wanted to be closer to the European Community (EC). It applied for 
membership in 1987. In 1989, the European Commission declined the application, but 
deferred it for more favorable circumstances. The end of the Cold War propelled 
Turkey’s aspiration to be a part of EU enlargement because of three main reasons: First, 
having been a member of the western camp and shouldering the European security and 
defense in NATO’s southern flank, it was natural for Turkey to demand being included in 
the new European architecture to which it contributed. Second, the Ankara Agreement 
acknowledges the prospect of Turkey's full membership in the EU. Third, and related to 
the first, is the consolidation of Turkey’s identity as a European country instead of one 
that could be drawn into Middle Eastern politics in the post-Cold War era, and broadly 
for political and economic stability in the country. 
In 1997, the Commission reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility for membership, but 
excluded it from the enlargement process, and cited a number of political issues as pre-
conditions for propelling the relations. Turkey perceived it as discriminatory and the 
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relations were strained when Turkey did not participate in the inaugural meeting of the 
European Conference in March 1998.  
The year 1999 was one of important developments: Turkey and Greece 
established a dialogue by the initiative of their respective foreign ministers. These 
dialogues were mainly initiated after relations were strained due to the capture of the 
PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya; and they 
continued after the earthquakes in Turkey and in Greece in late 1999, when both 
countries were among the first to send search and rescue missions or to extend other 
kinds of help to each other. The United States was the mediator to ease Turkish-Greek 
relations after the Öcalan crisis: The then State Department Special Coordinator, Thomas 
Miller visited Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in early March 1999. Before the visit, Greek 
newspapers reported some Greek gestures, like giving up the veto against Turkey’s EU 
financing or discuss cooperation packages conditional on Turkey’s specific steps either in 
the Aegean or Cyprus.123  
Also, the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis and Foreign Minister Yorgos 
Papandreou pondered over a politico-diplomatic initiative to normalize relations with 
Turkey, such as meetings of respective foreign ministers, even a visit by the Greek 
Foreign Minister to Turkey,124 which actually took place in early 2000. Miller’s visit was 
mainly about the Cyprus issue, and he also conveyed Ankara the message that a crisis 
atmosphere with Greece is not sustainable for the resolution of issues.125 In May 1999, 
Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem sent his Greek counterpart a letter that called for 
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an effort to solve problems in Turkish-Greek relations, proposing an agreement between 
Ankara and Athens to fight against terrorism, and stated that Ankara was open for 
dialogue.126 June 1999 was the first meeting of the colleagues in New York127, and the 
ensuing dialogue reflected on the politics within the EU towards Turkey. 
Then, the United States applied pressure on European capitals not to alienate 
Turkey from Europe, and some European states took initiatives to bring Turkish and the 
EU officials together. As a result of these efforts, Turkey was officially declared a 
candidate for full membership to the EU at the Helsinki European Council in December 
1999, and a new period started in Turkish-EU relations.  
Post-Helsinki period basically refers to the expectation from Turkey to 
accomplish its best for eventual EU membership. Candidate states have the obligation of 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria which state that membership requires: 
— that the candidate State has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, 
— the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, 
— the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims 
of political, economic and monetary union.128 
 
Apart from declaring Turkey a candidate, the 1999 Helsinki European Council 
Conclusions also stated that: 
…the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the 
Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations 
and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the 
Union.129 
 
                                                 
126 “Yunanistan için Son Şans, (Last Chance for Greece)”, Hürriyet, 2 June 1999, p. 20. 
127 Satiris Sidheris, “The Secret Papandreou-Cem Discussion,” Exousia (FBIS), July 6, 1999, p.4.  
128 Copenhagen European Council Conclusions, 21-22 June, 1993 : 
<www.europarl.eu.int/enlargement_new/ europeancouncil/pdf/cop_en.pdf> 
129 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, 10 and 11 December 1999, 
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Thus, Turkey’s goal now is the fulfillment of the accession criteria-especially the 
political criteria in order to begin the accession talks. These accession criteria include, 
among others, short and medium term political and economic criteria, for which Turkey 
should go through a number of reforms. The pre-accession strategy includes an 
Accession Partnership, which was drawn up on March 8, 2001, and then in May 2003, in 
order to stimulate and support these reforms in Turkey, and a National Program (March 
19, 2001) on the part of Turkey for the adoption of the acquis. Now that Turkey’s 
primary task is meeting these criteria, there is a high expectation that Turkey should do 
its best to start the accession talks as early as possible.  
Turkey has undertaken a number of important steps towards this end. The most 
significant ones have been amendments in the Constitution in order to improve human 
rights situation in Turkey, to strengthen the rule of law and to restructure democratic 
institutions. Following that, the Turkish Parliament adopted a new Civil Code, to improve 
the freedom of association and the right to assembly, as well as gender equality and child 
protection. These efforts for reform were enshrined in three legislative packages: The 
February and April 2002 legislative packages amended various legislations to further the 
freedoms of expression, press, association and peaceful assembly. The third legislative 
package of August 2002 introduced sweeping reforms, inter alia, the abolition of the 
death penalty and lifting legal restrictions on individual cultural rights. The new Turkish 
government prepared other legislative packages, related to reinforcing the reform process, 
eliminating the ambiguities with respect to the implementation of these reforms, and one 
about human rights. 
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The EU opened up accession negotiations with all candidates, but Turkey since 
the latter “…does not yet meet the political conditions.”130 Turkey engaged in a public 
relations campaign before the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002 to get a 
“date” from the EU in order to start accession talks. Turkey was a given a “date” at the 
Copenhagen European Council Conclusions for the evaluation of its progress with the 
accession criteria. It was agreed that accession negotiations may begin from December 
2004, if the Council decides that Turkey have fulfilled the political criteria, on the basis 
of a report and recommendation from the Commission to that effect.  
The May 2003 Accession Partnership Document of the European Council drew 
attention to the European Commission regular reports on the performance of the 
candidate countries, and listed the priority tasks that should be undertaken by Turkey in 
the period of 2003/2004, along with those whose completion would take more than one 
year. Framed under enhanced political dialogue and political criteria, these priorities, 
include, inter alia, the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, resolution of 
outstanding border disputes, ratification of international agreements related to human 
rights and their implementation, guaranteeing cultural rights,  “[a]dapt[ing] the 
functioning of the National Security Council in order to align civilian control of the 
military with practice in EU Member States,” and aligning the functioning of State 
security courts…131 The March 2001 Accession Partnership document also highlighted 
“…align[ing] the constitutional role of the National Security Council (NSC) as an 
advisory body to the [g]overnment in accordance with the practice of the EU [m]ember 
                                                 
130 Enlargement-Introduction, EU Official Website, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/enlargement.htm> (September 1, 2002) 
131 Council Decision of May 19, 2003, on the principles, priorities, intermediate objectives and conditions 
contained in the Accession Partnership with Turkey, Official Journal of the European Union L 145/40 
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[s]tates,”132 in that the military should serve the civilian administration in order to ensure 
the democratic functioning of the NSC. 
The role of the military in the NSC is the least flexible to comply with the 
political criteria due to Turkey’s domestic political structure and its geopolitical status. It 
will be one of the main bones of contention between Turkish-EU relations, particularly, 
because of the perceived challenges to state and regime security in Turkey: What ensure 
social and territorial integrity of Turkey are the principles of nationalism and secularism, 
and mechanisms in action to restore the balance whenever these principles are 
challenged. Specifically, granting rights to diverse groups based on ethnicity or religion 
are perceived as potential threats to the regime in Turkey. In this sense, it is the Turkish 
military which intervenes to restore this balance, especially in fighting against 
secessionist terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism.  
The EU recalls the February 28, 1997 decisions by the National Security Council, 
which started a process that led to the end of the Welfare Party coalition government.133 
That is why, the EU sees that the status of the military in the National Security Council 
should be such that the military should be under civilian control, and not vice versa. The 
national polls always place the military as the most reliable institution. Moreover, even if 
Turkey records strides in realizing the priority tasks with respect to human rights, Cyprus 
issue and border disputes, it would still want to maintain and even increase the weight of 
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the military in order to be able to balance the likely threats that can emanate due to these 
challenges. The Turkish government is determined to fulfill the political criteria and they 
have prepared two packages to accommodate some institutions with the EU practice. 
Among them is the NSC, and the current provisions do not match EU’s expectations 
though they foresee some changes regarding the NSC.  
The Turkish Parliament adopted these two sets of laws, the so-called sixth and 
seventh accommodation packages.134 The latter made some changes regarding the NSC 
secretariat, however, it envisages more of civilian control rather than a decrease in the 
standing of the military members. The 7th package decreased the frequency of NSC 
meetings. Overall, these changes are not to the full satisfaction of the EU regarding the 
alignment of the role of the NSC along with EU practice. 
Turkey’s responses to external security threats from the Middle East will be 
another agenda-setter, in that it will be so difficult to have a common foreign and security 
policy towards the issues in the Middle East due to the difference in geography and 
perceptions. Thus, the proliferation threat in the Middle East and Turkey’s response is 
likely to add a new item in Turkish-EU agenda in the foreseeable future, not only because 
it is an external security issue (that is more of a problem of Turkey than the EU), but also 
it will require the involvement of security circles more in decision-making process, hence 
is implicitly related to the EU accession criteria.  
The War on Iraq demonstrated that Europeans can have different stances for the 
defense of outer flank even in a collective defense organization, so, it should not be 
surprising that serious problems will arise in framing a common foreign and security 
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policy within the EU when Turkey defines threats in the Middle East differently, and 
devises its own responses to ensure its security. Further, Turkey’s cooperation with the 
United States in security matters in the Middle East, and its strategic cooperation with 
Israel do not overlap with the European common foreign and security policy objectives, 
especially one that aims at becoming less dependent on the United States. The next 
section analyzes the incompatibilities in detail.  
 
 
4.2. TURKEY’S SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND POLICYMAKING AT ODDS 
WITH THE ACCESSION PROCESS 
 
 
4.2.1. Impacts of Turkey’s security policy on integration with Europe 
 
While Turkey adopted the policy that would more effectively address the 
proliferation threat than others,135 it is likely to constitute a tough issue in Turkey’s pre-
accession process to the EU regarding security-related matters. In his analysis of 
Turkey’s response to the WMD proliferation, Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu identifies some 
three drawbacks of this policy with respect to Turkey’s commitment for European 
integration:  
First, the US ‘Missile Shield’ project is not quite appealing to the Europeans 
because of the difference in security perceptions in either side of the Atlantic. Turkey’s 
unilateral involvement in the project as an outcome of its security strategy may create 
rifts in handling European security. Second, an enhanced trilateral cooperation with Israel 
and the United States in military affairs do not bode well with Europe’s political, military 
and strategic goals that include minimizing US influence in European security affairs. 
Finally, and most pertinent to the accession process is the outcome of the policy. One of 
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the short-term EU political criteria is the alignment of the role of the military in Turkish 
politics; however, Turkey’s involvement in costly missile defense projects will lead not 
only to an increase in Turkey’s military spending, but also in the role of military in the 
National Security Council in order to frame Turkey’s nonproliferation policy.136  
European views about the US Missile Defense project do not overlap with those 
of Turkey’s, let alone the likely controversy that may arise due to Turkey’s cooperation 
with the United States and Israel over missile defense projects. The United States and 
European allies have clearly different threat perceptions of WMD and missile 
proliferation. Key European states, such as Britain, France and Germany, do not favor 
national missile defenses as the best way to respond to the missile proliferation threat 
though they accept that it is legitimate to get –even increasingly- concerned about 
proliferation trends.137 Most European states have perceived Iran, Iraq and Syria as future 
economic partners rather than countries of concern with a potential WMD and missile 
threat. This is basically due to the different assessments of technological capabilities and 
political intentions, i.e. for the Europeans, the possession of a capability constitutes a 
potential risk; what makes it an urgent threat is political intent. Thus their threat 
perceptions are based on their political relationships with ‘states of concern.’  
Historically, Europeans have preferred to apply political criteria in assessing 
security threats, and have responded to existing threats politically and diplomatically 
rather than militarily. Their geographical position has also been an important factor in 
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their approach. The EU is a major political and economic partner of Syria138 and it has 
recently started negotiations with Iran for trade cooperation linked to the progress in a 
political dialogue that seeks to address, inter alia, the proliferation issues.139 Therefore, 
one can expect that political judgments would have the most decisive influence over their 
stance for a ballistic missile defense policy, rather than concerns about the existence of 
technical capabilities.140 The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU 
endorses a nonproliferation and disarmament policy that “…insists on the respect, 
development and effective implementation of international multilateral treaties and 
conventions…”141 that form the nonproliferation and arms control regimes, and it upholds 
export controls and safeguards as important complementary measures to reduce risks.142 
Behind the European position towards the US Missile Defense project lies the 
concern over the consequences of possible Russian and Chinese reactions to a unilateral 
US policy. Recently, the United States scrapped the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
in order to proceed with the Missile Shield project. The Treaty that was signed by the 
United States and the Soviet Union in 1972, forbids the deployment of nationwide anti-
ballistic missile defenses. The strategic doctrine of the Treaty is the principle of 
deterrence by the threat of retaliation. On the other hand, missile defenses eliminate the 
strategic balance among states that possess nuclear weapons. Both Russia and China have 
viewed the project as a threat to their strategic nuclear capabilities that would undermine 
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cooperation with the United States on disarmament and nonproliferation. In this context, 
Europeans are worried that the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty will encourage 
proliferation: That Russia and China will react by slowing down cooperation in tasks 
embodied in arms control and nonproliferation regimes.  
China’s pronounced commitments and undertakings for nonproliferation do not 
overlap. It is not a member of key multilateral export-control regimes including the 
MTCR. American intelligence community identifies China “as one of the key suppliers 
of materials and technologies that contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery systems”143. Chinese nonproliferation experts assess that to 
put leverage on the United States regarding NMD or TMD, China may choose not to live 
up to its nonproliferation commitments as retaliation to a perceived national security 
threat.144 
The Russian contribution to arms control and nonproliferation regimes is integral. 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an important task is to properly safeguard the 
unemployed sensitive material, technology and know-how that is necessary to develop 
WMD. Paucity in the proper implementation of programs to that effect would give 
impetus to illicit trafficking of the NBC material and drain of ex-Soviet expertise to 
aspirant states or terrorist groups-most of which are in the periphery of Europe. The 
bottomline for Europe is that the US project will be counterproductive, and that when 
Turkey goes along with the project, this would lead to its decoupling from Europe. 
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Recent developments seem to confirm the European position. In the Conference 
on Disarmament (CD), China linked its support to the negotiations to a Fissile Material 
Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which is key for disarmament, to talks on a treaty on the 
prevention of arms race in outer space (PAROS). After the United States withdrew from 
the ABM Treaty in December 2001, the negotiations in the CD in 2002 ended in a 
deadlock. There was no progress “…towards a fissile material treaty (fissban), nuclear 
disarmament, PAROS, and legally binding security assurances against nuclear attack.”145 
As an outcome of Russian and Chinese reaction to the US policy on missile defenses, 
discussions on PAROS overrode those for the FMCT.146 The Chinese statement also 
drew attention to other negative developments in nonproliferation and disarmament 
agreements due to US policies.147 After the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty 
formally took effect, Russia withdrew from START II due to the absence of the 
prerequisites for the entry into force of this agreement.148 A week later, the United States 
and Russia started working towards the ratification of the Moscow Treaty (START III), 
which would define the new strategic relationship between Russia and the United 
States.149 Russia is working with China in the CD for a new space treaty since it argues 
for preventing the weaponization of outer space as a response to the US policies. The US 
Senate approved the Moscow Treaty, but there have been problems with destroying the 
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Russian chemical weapon stockpile on time, and due to the Iraq crisis, the Russian Duma 
postponed the ratification of the Treaty.150  
A second controversial issue may arise out of Turkey’s strategic relationships 
with Israel and the United States, particularly in military matters, which improved over 
the 1990s. As opposed to Turkey’s contentment with the nature and context of relations 
with Israel, Europe is concerned that Turkey’s growing cooperation with Israel may 
eventually result in an enhanced trilateral alliance between Israel, Turkey and the United 
States due to common responses to proliferation in the Middle East. This, in turn, would 
cause Turkey to slow down its steps towards Europe, because Europeans argue that such 
a strategic relationship will barely overlap with the objectives of the EU in political, 
military and strategic fields.  
Most of the key EU members and the European NATO allies are trying to keep a 
considerable room of maneuver free from the United States, so they would oppose the 
idea of including a member that would be its advocate in Europe. The EU has defined its 
security and defense policy in its second pillar, namely the CFSP. The long-term politico-
military objectives of the EU are about attaining an autonomous security and defense 
capability that would address security threats to Europe. In the debates surrounding 
European security and defense policy (ESDP), one of the main issues has been to 
decrease dependency on the United States and taking EU-only decisions while making 
use of NATO assets and capabilities whenever necessary. The accession of a country 
which maintains a reinforced military cooperation with the United States would offset the 
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EU efforts to minimize American influence over European affairs. Apart from that, 
Turkey’s involvement in a trilateral TMD project with the United States and Israel would 
make some European NATO allies concerned and may lead to a rift in the Alliance. Most 
notably, Greece can be uneasy of the establishment of a Middle Eastern TMD due to its 
geographical proximity: Greece perceives Turkey as the prominent security threat, and 
would not welcome an increase in Turkey’s military posture or deterrent.  
Besides, the EU would be reluctant to import out-of-area security problems by 
accepting Turkey so close to Israel. Historically, the EU has adopted a Middle East policy 
which tried to maintain equidistance to the parties involved. Not only it served as a 
facilitator in the Arab-Israeli peace talks, but it is the first trading partner of Israel, and a 
major economic partner of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.151 Israel is the only 
nuclear-capable state in the Middle East and is not a party to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which would make it a non-nuclear weapon state as the 
other regional parties to the conflict. The absence of such a status for Israel is assessed to 
motivate regional NPT signatories, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Syria, to pursue WMD, and 
ballistic missile programs, and to refrain from signing key nonproliferation conventions, 
such as the CWC. This constituted a major deadlock in peace talks, and the EU would not 
want the inclusion of dynamics that will compel placing hard security issues over 
economic partnership on its agenda with these states.  
The final issue area is directly related to a critical artery in Turkey’s roadmap 
toward eventual membership to the EU, i.e. increased role of military over civilian 
administration and increased defense spending that will have political repercussions in 
                                                 
151 “The EU and the Middle East Peace Process,” European Commission, 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mepp/index.htm> 
 77 
 
Europe. The 1999 Helsinki European Council Conclusions, which declared Turkey 
candidate for EU membership, stated that: 
…the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the 
Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations 
and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the 
Union.152 
 
Turkey was then provided with a roadmap enshrined in the 2000 Accession 
Partnership Document, which set out short- and medium-term accession criteria. The EU 
opened up accession negotiations with all candidates, but Turkey since the latter “…does 
not yet meet the political conditions,”153 which include, inter alia, “…align[ing] the 
constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the 
[g]overnment in accordance with the practice of the EU [m]ember [s]tates.”154 
The criterion referred to the role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in politics 
based on the 1982 Constitution, which granted the military an equal right to vote and say 
with government members in a constitutional body, thereby making them a “covert 
partner” of the government; whereas in a properly functioning democracy, the civil 
administration and the ruling government should be above all governance. There has 
been no conflict of views with the civilian administration and the military as long as the 
Turkish governments applied a national security policy that foresaw fighting against 
ideologies that threaten the integrity of the Turkish state or its secular and republican 
regime. These internal security threats are Islamic fundamentalism and secessionism. The 
crisis in the National Security Council in 1997 was the most recent example of the 
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influence of the military over the civilian administration that in these matters the 
government needs to adopt the position of the military or it will be induced to do so.155  
European uneasiness over the role of military in Turkey is already a very sensitive 
subject in Turkish-EU relations. Turkey’s strategic relationship with Israel and the United 
States, particularly their cooperation to respond WMD proliferation in the Middle East, 
will require military assessments, policies and substantial expenditures. Hence the 
influence of the military is likely to increase in the National Security Council, which will 
put Turkey in opposite currents with the EU. 
These three issue areas lead to a paradox, which suggests that Turkey may put full 
membership at risk while trying to address its security concerns from the Middle East.156 
Another dynamic which will not let Turkey to pursue a mid-way is the fact that EU 
membership is not in horizon; therefore Turkey will prioritize vital security interests, and 
there will be resistance to change for a disproportional return. 
The following chapter will try to find a way out of this dilemma by proposing 
policies that uphold the needs and interests of Turkey and the EU. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
The above analysis has so far demonstrated the opposite forces that are driven by 
Turkey’s security policy and the prerequisites for European integration. The paper now 
tries to find the ways out of this apparent cul-de-sac by policies that would address the 
needs and interests of Turkey and the EU rather than their positions.157  
                                                 
157 Basically, the principles of conflict resolution theory are applied onto a case that involves states and 
international organizations as the main actors rather than human beings. The theory argues that human 
beings are inherently peaceful, yet aggressive when they are frustrated about their unsatisfied needs. 
Protracted conflicts usually emerge as a result of the denial of basic needs, and conflicts can only be 
resolved, that is, integrative outcomes with win-win solutions can be attained, when such needs are 
satisfied. Thus, the process of conflict resolution should start with breaking down the positions (i.e. 
concrete demands) of the parties into their underlying interests and needs. Source: Conflict Resolution 
Online Learning Project, Center for Conflict Resolution, University of Bradford, 
<http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/confres/dislearn/objectivunit1.html>; Also See John W. Burton, 
Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook, Lanham, MD and London: University Press of America, 
1987. 
Process and outcome are heavily influenced by the level of analysis, that is, if negotiations are carried out 
on the basis positions, which is one’s desired concrete outcome of the resolution of the conflict, then it 
leads to a competitive process where there will be winners and losers. Thus, the parties are urged to bargain 
as hard as possible in order to achieve maximum gains. If negotiations are carried out on the basis of 
interests, that is, the reason why one wants the desired outcome, this leads to integrative bargaining, which 
is a collaborative process and based on the premise that conflict can be resolved in a way that both parties’ 
interests can be met in a settlement, a win-win situation. If the level of analysis is needs, then parties 
engage in joint problem solving to satisfy them, which is the key for a just and lasting outcome of inter-
group conflict. Source: Interviews with Dr. Donna Hicks and Dr. William Wiseberg- Program on 
International Conflict Analysis and Resolution, July 2001. Also see John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and 
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The thesis indeed studied how Turkey responded to meet its security needs, and 
how it clashed with the positions and interests of the EU. One can argue that if Turkey 
considers the needs that lie beneath the interests of the EU, and applies the policies that 
would address those needs, then Turkey’s security policy and its steps towards 
integration with Europe can proceed more smoothly. The underlying parameters of 
policymaking to that goal are twofold: First, to maintain survival, state response to a 
threat is to seek adequate defenses: Thus, Turkey will respond to the WMD and missile 
proliferation threat to meet security needs. As the analysis explained above, it started to 
cooperate with the United States and Israel and it will continue doing so. Second, 
eventual membership to the EU has been Turkey’s state policy since the Republican 
years. Now that it is a candidate, Turkey is supposed to meet the accession criteria for full 
membership, and cannot expect the EU to bend its principles for the unique 
circumstances of Turkey. Now is the time to revisit the points of controversy with 
spectacles that see what lies beneath the positions. 
 
5.1. OPERATIONALIZATION: ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM ON THE BASIS 
OF NEEDS AND INTERESTS 
 
This section takes the apparent points of controversy on a case-by-case basis and 
seeks to attain outcomes that will satisfy both the interests of Turkey and the EU within 
the parameters that define their relationship. It will also form the backbone of a national 
                                                                                                                                                 
Provention, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990; Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: 
War, Peace and the Global System, London: SAGE, 2002. 
Therefore, to attain a sustainable outcome out of an international conflict, one should break down the 
positions and interests of states into their needs and devise policies that would directly address the latter.  
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strategy that this study envisages for Turkey to attain its objectives in its foreign policy 
towards Europe and security policy towards the Middle East. 
First, as an integral part of the accession process, the EU would like to see a 
diminished influence of the Turkish military over politics. The alignment of the 
constitutional role of the National Security Council is constrained by other security 
challenges that do not pertain to Turkey’s external security policy. As a matter of fact, the 
security issues that are related to religious fundamentalism and secessionism still 
dominate the security agenda; and the Turkish military considers giving up such status 
conditioned on the elimination of these threats instead of for the sake of complying with 
the EU criteria. Moreover, the Turkish opinion polls suggest that the military is the most 
trusted institution by the people, because there is a strong conviction that a chaos that 
may be created by these two issues can be overcome or mitigated by the military rather 
than the civil administration. Thus, the military is perceived as a balancing (f)actor of 
Turkish democracy rather than a disrupter. Currently, the threat assessments, responses, 
policy planning and budgeting are all within the realm of the military.158  
                                                 
158 The Turkish Armed Forces meet to consider which projects will be implemented and determine the 
strategic action plan, i.e. projects are implemented according to this action plan. They are finalized by the 
Defense Industry Executive Committee, which is composed of the Prime Minister, the Defense Ministry 
officials and Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) officials. The principle is that the projects directed to the SSM 
are put in action towards meeting the needs of the TAF and of domestic industrialization. The process of 
production is as follows: The Land, Air and Naval Forces transmit their requirements to the General Staff 
to be considered in the Ten Year Procurement Plan. If the needs will not be met by direct procurement, the 
request is handled by the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries (SSM with Turkish acronyms). It is the 
Defense Industry Executive Committee which leads the process. Following the request for proposals, the 
firms put forward their proposals, which are evaluated by the project office of the SSM. After the final 
selection, contract negotiations start. The economic aspect is evaluated by the SSM while the technical and 
tactical evaluation is done jointly by the SSM and the TAF. After the contract is signed, the domestic 
production process starts, and finally the product is tested and accepted (throughout the guarantee period, 
the SSM is responsible). The budget of the SSM is of its own. The expenses are controlled by the Defense 
Industry Executive Committee, where there is no political control. Source: SSM Handbook, Turkish 
Ministry of Defense-Undersecretariat for Defense Industries, 2000; Interviews with SSM officials, who 
would like to be cited anonymously. 
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To find a mid-way between its domestic and international policies, and to convey 
intent and cooperativeness to the EU, Turkey can choose to increase the weight of civil 
actors in security policy- in our case, its nonproliferation policy, by engaging the foreign 
and the defense ministries into Turkey’s efforts for disarmament and nonproliferation. 
The implications of the proposed policy will be an increased role of civil circles in the 
National Security Council, thereby leveling the weight between the government and the 
military. That would also be appealing to the TAF because not only civil agents will 
speak the same language with them, but also it will not put the military under the 
spotlight to hinder the EU integration process. 
Second, adding to the European criticisms about the US missile defense project 
are the increased European concerns about Russian and Chinese reactions to the US 
missile defense policy since the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 
December 2001. The position of Russia and China is an extension of the need/interest to 
preserve the strategic nuclear balance with the United States, which would be disrupted 
by a US missile defense system. National missile defenses basically leave the missile-
capable states without a second-strike capability. The Treaty had enshrined mutual 
vulnerability by stipulating that the United States and the Soviet Union would not pursue 
nationwide anti-ballistic missile defenses. However, in the case of Turkey’s missile 
defense involvement in a Middle Eastern TMD, the area that would be covered does not 
target in its range Russian and Chinese missiles that can be launched from deep inside 
their territories. In this context, Turkey can communicate this detail to Europe as well as 
Russia and China by a technical and political assessment that stresses the underlying 
motives and intentions of a TMD between Israel, Turkey and the United States, and 
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demonstrate that it is aimed at defending against threats from the Middle East, and not 
directed against Russia and China. The concerns of Greece can be soothed in the same 
vein- that the facilities are not deployed in the west, but in the east against Middle 
Eastern threats, and to augment the air defenses of Turkey’s land and air forces, hence 
not intended for altering the strategic balance in eastern Mediterranean –but a pitfall is 
that Greece may argue about a possible allocation of more fighter aircraft to its western 
borders, that is, to contingencies with Greece.  
In NATO, with US political support, Turkey should also emphasize that instead of 
creating rifts, missile defense assets and capabilities at the southern flank of Europe will 
be to Europe’s interest indeed: In the short and medium-term, a TMD can be employed to 
provide a defense umbrella to the Rapid Reaction Force of the EU in future out-of-area 
missions. Basically, Turkey should take on a strategy that focuses on making the 
deployment beneficial to Europe. 
Third, like the Europeans, Turkey is equally concerned about horizontal 
proliferation which can be spurred by a Russian or Chinese retaliation to US policy. The 
potential proliferators and aspiring groups are around Turkey’s neighborhood. In 
Turkey’s Middle Eastern borders, smuggling is a fact; but when it comes to the 
smuggling of sensitive material, inaction is too costly to afford. Thus, bolstering export 
controls and safeguards of sensitive material and especially of dual-use items should 
become a prior task in nonproliferation strategic planning.  
In this sense, Turkey’s quest should be to elevate its tone in export control 
regimes and other efforts, and to become increasingly involved in safeguards and export 
control regimes as it will also overlap with the policies of the EU: The Council of the EU 
 84 
 
has a regulation for export controls of dual-use items and technology that set up a regime 
at the community level. EU assistance programs are available for Russia, the Newly 
Independent States and North Korea to support efforts for nonproliferation and 
disarmament. A specific area that Turkey can contribute is the CFSP EU Joint Action on 
nonproliferation and disarmament, which was introduced in the context of EU Common 
Strategy in the Russian Federation. The Joint Action envisages the implementation of 
projects on nuclear and chemical disarmament with a focus on the disposal of weapons-
grade plutonium (i.e., Pu-239 isotope, which is a key material to fabricate a nuclear 
weapon). However, the projects under the Joint Action have expired in June 2003 despite 
increasing concerns over horizontal proliferation through illegal means or loopholes in 
current regimes. At this point, Turkey can come up with additional projects for the EU, or 
it can offer the advantages of its geography and get involved in new or existing projects 
as a physical contributor to oversee the transfer of sensitive items. This can start Turkish-
EU cooperation in a brand-new field that would complement Turkey’s contribution to 
European security. That would also demonstrate that Turkey would work for the CFSP, 
thereby soothing the worries that it will be a US agent in the EU despite a likely 
reinforced strategic relationship. 
Turkey can also take part in the joint efforts by the United States and the EU for 
nonproliferation cooperation. After the War on Iraq, US President G.W. Bush welcomed 
the presidents of the EU Council and Commission in the United States, and they issued a 
joint declaration regarding proliferation of WMD. In their statement, they agreed on basic 
principles of nonproliferation, as well as specific actions to be undertaken to serve the 
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maintenance of these principles. Among these decisions, two are noteworthy for Turkey’s 
proposed course of action:  
-We will strengthen both export controls on materials and technologies related to WMD and 
their delivery systems as well as their enforcement and implementation… We will work 
together with like-minded partners to tighten export controls, where necessary providing 
assistance to create and improve effective, enforceable national export control systems…  
 
-We remain concerned at the pursuit of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and missiles 
for their delivery by a number of other States. We will continue to monitor these closely and to 
exchange information, including with other concerned States.159 
 
Turkey can take advantage of the statements in italic and highlight its geostrategic 
status to play a key role in materializing the goals set by the United States and the EU. 
Being situated in the midst of transit routes for smuggling, it can underline its concern for 
the illicit trafficking of sensitive and dual-use material, and convey its readiness to 
exchange information. Being able to do that requires increased attention on these issues 
in state circles, academia and media. 
Turkey’s strategic cooperation with Israel in military matters seems to remain as 
long as military cooperation with European states is blocked by human rights concerns, 
and that with the United States is shaped by the dynamics in the US Congress.160 Turkey 
already attaches great value to the strategic cooperation with the United States and 
Israel161, and may not put a restraint in order to accommodate with the positions of major 
European capitals. Basically, since EU membership is not in the horizon for the short-
                                                 
159 Joint Statement by President George W. Bush, European Council President Konstandinos Simitis, and 
European Commission President Romano Prodi on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 
White House News Release, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030625-17.html> 
emphasis mine. 
160 The United States gives foreign aid on the basis of laws that should be approved by the Congress. The 
draft laws go through relevant committees and subcommittees where Congressmen give their approval or 
disapproval. The anti-Turkish lobbies in these committees are sometimes effective to block foreign aid to 
Turkey; hence though the administration may want to extend foreign aid, the last word remains with the 
Congress. The Jewish lobby has acted as a counterforce to the anti-Turkish lobbies that include Armenian, 
Greek and Kurdish. 
161 See Efraim Inbar, “Regional Implications of Turkish-Israeli Strategic Partnership” MERIA, Vol. 5, No. 
2, June 2001: <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue2/jv5n2a5.html> 
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term, Turkey will continue to define its security perceptions differently from the Europe. 
In this sense, one should expect continuing efforts to obtain anti-ballistic missile systems 
in cooperation with allies.  
The EU need to attain an autonomous capability in security matters is 
conceivable. The differences between the United States and some European states 
regarding threat perceptions became crystal-clear in the context of the debate on Iraq. 
With the Nice Treaty, the EU has already blocked Turkey’s possible overriding influence 
in the EU due to the population of the country, which would otherwise assign equal 
number of votes as Germany, France and the UK in the European Commission. So, it is 
unlikely that the EU will be forced to deal with issues by Turkey’s pressure. Regarding 
the Middle East policy, Turkey has always tried to pursue a balanced policy in the region, 
and its interests dictate that it continues doing so. 
 Based on this analysis, the last section is a compendium of the proposed course of 
actions. 
 
5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The current state of Turkey’s response to proliferation is not only shaped by the 
capabilities of its neighbors, but by the pursuit of great power interests in its immediate 
neighborhood that can well pull the trigger to employ these weapons against Turkey. 
Turkey was stuck in-between the United States and Europe during the War on Iraq, and 
this study was an attempt to see the picture in a broader sense, that is, to assess the 
impacts of Turkey’s response to security threats in the Middle East and its 
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incompatibilities in its foreign policy towards the EU. These incompatibilities are hard to 
sustain in the medium-run, even in the short run as Turkey feels the urgency to start 
accession talks with the EU, and has been engaged in an effort to accommodate itself 
with the EU criteria, especially the political criteria.  
This study has shown that there will be important factors that will inevitably pull 
Turkey towards the other end, and prevent a smooth ride to the final destination, that is 
EU membership. Thus, it tried to address this dilemma, and to find out whether there is a 
way out of this apparent cul-de-sac. The argument is that there can be a way if Turkey 
incorporates the courses of action this study has found out by operationalizing the issue 
areas on the basis of needs and interests of parties in order to satisfy both. This section 
compiles the highlights of the previous analysis and recommends it as a national 
nonproliferation strategy that will serve Turkey’s short-term needs and long-term 
interests. 
Thus, this study proposes that, Turkey should: 
• Engage foreign and defense ministries more into the policymaking and strategic 
decision making to address the threats from the Middle East and ensure sharing of 
information with the military institutions. To that end, a network for intelligence 
agencies is essential to share information and expertise.  
• Encourage academic research to support the activities at the official level by calls 
for papers and proposals in nonproliferation studies. The diversity of issues 
ranging from nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and delivery systems, 
necessitates an interdisciplinary approach. To that end, new programs can be 
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established in universities to attract science and engineering students to contribute 
and specialize on the technical aspect of proliferation.  
• Encourage nonproliferation education and training for the military and civil 
society in general to understand and appreciate the proliferation risks and threats 
and to create awareness at the grassroots level that short-term economic gains 
may result in medium and long-term security challenges that are irreversible.  
• Start dealing problems in Turkey’s border regulations to combat smuggling and 
illicit trafficking of sensitive material. Bolstering export controls at the national 
level is identified by this study as a key policy which Turkey can benefit from and 
provide benefits to its allies. The Turkish Prime Ministry Customs 
Undersecretariat is the official agency that regulates issues about borders. Its 
focus on smuggling is more about drugs, cigarette, alcoholic drinks, arms,162 etc… 
and not so much on medical and agricultural products, which can be precursors, 
raw materials or anti-dote of chemical or biological weapons. Also, the Customs 
Undersecretariat has recently introduced a project on modernizing the Customs 
Administrations (GIMOP- Turkish acronym for “The Project on the 
Modernization of Customs Administrations” / Gümrük İdarelerini Modernizasyon 
Projesi). The World Bank supports this project with resources for the 
modernization and automation of customs administrations. One of the most 
important targets of the project is to make customs controls more selective and 
more effective. It is already specified that this project needs to be revised 
according to the EU Customs Union criteria.163 At this point, the thesis 
                                                 
162 Prime Ministry of Turkey, Customs Undersecretariat. http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/toctum1.htm 
163 ibid. 
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recommends that while modifying the project, Turkey should give special 
emphasis on export controls of dual-use medical equipment and chemical 
materials, and also stipulate the issuing of end-user certificate for such items that 
are imported. To complement this strategy at the international level, Turkey 
should increase its standing in international export control regimes, by providing 
timely information and analysis on smuggling and illicit trafficking that is taking 
place through its territory, and the efforts it undertook to combat these trends.  
• Convey its concerns about proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles in its 
neighborhood, and the risk it incurs particularly due to the increased tone of the 
United States against proliferators. The War on Iraq is a perfect rationale for why 
Turkey is uneasy about the insufficiency of its collective security deterrent and its 
defense capabilities, therefore to pursue the acquisition of missile defenses with 
the United States and Israel.  
• Demonstrate the significance of advanced defense systems at the disposal of 
Turkey for the security of Europe to counter WMD and ballistic missile 
proliferation in the Middle East.  
• Integrate into nonproliferation policy planning the principles of the Prague 
Capabilities Commitment (PCC), a new capabilities initiative adopted by the 
NATO Heads of State and Government at the Prague Summit in November 2002. 
The PCC is an initiative for strengthening defenses against terrorism, and it will 
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seek to bring improvements in areas which include ‘defense against CBRN 
attacks.’164  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study tackled the WMD and missile proliferation in the Middle East, as an 
international security issue that is likely to constitute an important agenda item in 
Turkey’s integration with the EU. WMD and missile proliferation is important though not 
one that is much discussed either in Turkey or in Europe due to threat perceptions that are 
not solely based on technical capabilities, but more on political relations with aspiring 
states. However, for Turkey, the threat has grown considerably to become a real one 
rather than a potential risk. Thus, since the late 1990s, Turkey has chosen to adopt active 
defense policy in order to respond to the proliferation of WMD in its region, and engaged 
in talks about procurement of missile defense systems with the United States and Israel.  
                                                 
164 Turkey’s Security Perceptions and its Relations with NATO-Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm#II> 
(September 8, 2003) 
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The thesis referred to the work of Dr. Mustafa Kibaroğlu, who observed that 
Turkey’s responses to the proliferation threat would create certain points of controversy 
that may jeopardize Turkey’s full membership to the EU, such as Turkey’s strategic 
cooperation with the United States and Israel, and the possible increase in defense 
spending and in role of the military in shaping Turkey’s defense policy. It took Dr. 
Kibaroğlu’s assessments one step further by adding that “unless effectively dealt with…”  
To effectively deal with the implications of Turkey’s responses to the 
proliferation threat on the pre-accession process to the EU, it argued that a conflict can be 
resolved if one starts from addressing the unfulfilled needs and interests. On this premise, 
the thesis put in operation the concerns of Turkey and the EU based on their needs and 
interests as a state and an international organization, in order to get out from the apparent 
paradox; and on the basis of the findings, it suggested policies or actions that would 
address these needs. These policies were then enshrined in a broad national 
nonproliferation strategy for Turkey. 
As the post-9/11 US security policy is in progress, Turkey is still being affected 
by the post- War on Iraq reconstruction process and by the changes in this policy. The 
United States has had hard times with proving the WMD capability that Iraq supposedly 
retained, and it applies pressure on Iran for undeclared facilities that could be proof of a 
development program for a nuclear weapon. It is impossible for Turkey not to be affected 
by unilateral or multilateral US policies in its neighborhood. Thus, it is integral that 
Turkey adopt a nonproliferation strategy which not only would make up the gaps in its 
deterrent and defense capabilities, but also would bolster preventive diplomatic initiatives 
it might take to address the situation in its neighborhood. As a matter of fact, Turkey can 
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also demonstrate its indispensability for the security of the region by giving more 
emphasis and attention to WMD-related issues both in the Middle East and the world in 
general. This would have positive repercussions beyond its western borders, and convey 
important messages to the EU that having Turkey as a candidate is not a harbinger of 
problems for the Union, but enhanced security and dialogue with the regions out of reach.  
Turkey has eagerly completed the seventh accommodation package and passed it 
in the Parliament. It is more than impatient to be given a date to start accession talks with 
the EU. If this process is postponed for a “later” time, it will inevitably shift Turkey’s 
leaning towards the United States and Israel, and could well alienate it from Europe. It is 
also the time for Europe to decide whether they would like to see a Turkey which has 
become subservient to the United States in its war against the WMD-possessor anti-
American states, or one that has a European prospect to hold onto.  
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